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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
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ARTICLES
EQUAL PROTECTION, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCES IN
LAW ADMISSIONS
DEFUNIS v. ODEGAARD
Arval A. Morris*
In race relations, affirmative action programs' are used to give
preferential treatment to certain minority group members in an at-
tempt to redress some of the deleterious effects of past racial or ethnic
discrimination and to correct current racial imbalances. 2 Underlying
affirmative action programs are two of the most cherished ideals of
American society: (1) that self-fulfillment, and the fulfillment of
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, B.A. Colorado College, 1951; M.A.,
1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., Yale University, 1958; LLD., Colo-
rado College, 1972.
1. The term comes from labor relations; see, e.g., Labor Management Relations
Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (197 1). In education, courts have authorized and/or
ordered school administrators to use numerical quotas in order to increase minority
group representation at white schools; see Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the
1970's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality Schools, 1970 Wisc. L. REV.
257 (1970).
2. The constitutionality and desirability of preferential treatment for minority
groups has been discussed by B. BITrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973);
Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 65 (1969); Bell, In
Defense of Minority Admissions Programs: A Response to Professor Gaglia, 119 U. PA.
L. REV. 364 (1970); Elden, "Forty Acres and A Mule," With Interest: The Constitu-
tionality of Black Capitalism, Benign School Quotas, and Other Statutory Racial Classi-
fications, 47 J. URBAN L. 591 (1969); Hughes, Reparation for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1063 (1968); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Vieira, Racial Imbalance,
Black Separatism, and Permissible Classifications by Race, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1553
(1969) and Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society--Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
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human potentialities can best be achieved by one's own efforts and (2)
that the good society is one that, as much as possible, provides to each
person the opportunities, the materials and the mind, character and
spirit essential for self-development so that each person can achieve
his self-fulfillment by engaging in a life and career that conform to his
reasoned and mature choice. DeFunis v. Odegaard,3 in which the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a racially
conditioned affirmative action program, represents the first appellate
test of a program in higher education designed to aid minorities in
achieving these ideals.
The term "affirmative action" is neither self-defining nor descriptive
of any one, specific program. It is a generic term vaguely describing a
range of possible programs which are characterized by an institution's
taking some kind of initiative, either voluntarily or under compulsion
of law, to increase the number or the status of certain minority group
members within a larger group. Frequently, but not always, a racial
classification is used, and the character of the initiative taken can vary
widely. Thus, a governmental affirmative action program could be
designed to redress racial imbalances in employment. It could seek to
achieve this goal either by generally requiring that all federally as-
sisted construction contractors and subcontractors afford equal em-
ployment opportunities 4 or by specifically requiring that all federally
assisted contractors and subcontractors make use of a racial criterion
-perhaps by adopting racial quotas-and engage in bona fide efforts
to achieve certain goals of minority group employment. 5 Reasoning
3. 82 Wn. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1973)(No. 73-235).
4. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(1970), as amended, Exec. OrderNo. 11,375,3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70 Comp.), 42 U.S.C.
§2000(e) (1970) (sex discrimination) and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803
(1966-70 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970). The contractor must agree to the cove-
nants contained in section 202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1971) states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance.
5. Acting pursuant to § 201 of Exec. Order No. 11,246 (see note 4 supra), the Secre-
tary of Labor promulgated the Philadelphia Plan in 1969. For the text of the plan, see I
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 1708 (1972). For commentary defending the
plan's legality, see Comment, Tile Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Execu-
tive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1972); Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas,
1970 Wisc. L. REV. 341; Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades:
An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970) and Note, The
Philadelphia Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6
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from the school-desegregation cases and recognizing the magnitude of
the deleterious consequences of racial discrimination, Professor
Bittker writes that this latter type of program implies "that we can
have a color-blind society in the long run only if we refuse to be
color-blind in the short run" and "the remedy, in short, is some hair of
the dog that bit us." 6
Recently, colleges, universities and law schools voluntarily have
adopted analogous affirmative action programs of varying kinds,
usually involving racial admission preferences. Generally, preferential
law admissions policies classify all qualified applicants on the basis of
their race or ethnic background and then apply one set of admission
standards to white students and a different, less stringent set of aca-
demic standards to certain minority group members, thereby giving
them a preference on racial grounds and denying admission to that
number of academically better qualified white students who are dis-
placed by operation of the program.7 The exit standards remain un-
changed.
The case for an affirmative action program is especially compelling
in the case of law schools. There is no reason to believe that the native
ability needed to complete law school successfully and to enter the
practicing bar is solely restricted to any one or few favored racial
groups in American society. To the contrary, there is reason to believe
that measurable intelligence traits associated with legal skills are
spread across the spectrum of America's racial groups8 and that un-
COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 187 (1970). The Philadelphia Plan was upheld in Contractors
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d'Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971). See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) which required that
one of every three persons hired by the Minneapolis Fire Department be chosen from a
special minority list; Wiener v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 238 N.E.2d 839
(Ohio C.P. 1968), affd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1004 (1970) which upheld the "Cleveland Plan;" the requiring of a percentage of mi-
nority hiring was sustained in United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) which allowed a school board voluntarily
to suspend use of a seniority list for the selection of principals and vice-principals where
the Board's motivation was to increase the number of Blacks in administrative positions
and United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' Local 46, 471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1973).
6. B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 120 (1973).
7. The displaced persons need not be denied a legal education. For example, De-
Funis, the displaced plaintiff, had been accepted by four other law schools. 82 Wn. 2d at
30,507 P.2d at 1181 n.ll.
8. L. EHRMAN, G. OMEN & E. CASPARI, GENETICS, ENVIRONMENT- AND BEHAVIOR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY (1972).
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even occupational statistics are primarily a reflection of differences in
social and family environment.9 The national statistics show that law-
yers who are also minority group members do not populate the prac-
ticing bar in proportions roughly equal to their numbers in the under-
lying population as a whole. On the other hand, if there were truly
equal access to legal education one would expect to find roughly the
same proportion of lawyers who are minority group members as there
are minorities in the population as a whole. To illustrate the present
disparity, it is estimated that there are 324,818 lawyers in the United
States, 10 but of that number only 3, 845 are black lawyers and 214 are
black judges." Blacks make up about twelve percent of the American
population, but only about one percent of the American bar. ' 2 Roughly
the result is that only one Black lawyer is available for 5,735 Blacks, as
compared with one non-black lawyer for every 631 non-blacks. Since
many Black lawyers work in state or federal employment, the actual
number available for private practice is even smaller than these statis-
tics reveal. Professor Ernest Gellhorn has estimated that even if the
aggregate size of the legal profession remained unchanged "an addi-
tional 30,000 Negro attorneys would need to be trained before the
Negro would achieve parity in the legal profession."' 13 The situation is
certainly no better, and probably worse, for Spanish surnamed
persons 14 and American Indians.' 5
9. See note 166 infra.
10. THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12.
1I. The 1960-70 statistics were obtained by a questionnaire survey from the Gover-
nors of the 50 states and from individual inquiries made of National Bar Association
members at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Association in New York City. July 21-25
(1970); they are printed as the REPORT OF BLACK LAWYERS AND JUDGES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1960-70, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 30,786 (1970). In some states
the underrepresentation was gross: Georgia had a black population of 1,122,596 and
4,824 total lawyers, but only 30 black lawyers and three black judges; Illinois had a
black population of 1,037,470 and a total of 19,045 lawyers but only 667 black
lawyers and 26 black judges, and 17 states had five or less black lawyers and black
judges! See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Tables, 17 & 18 (1970): OFFICE OF
PROGRAM PLANNING AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, POCKET
DATA BOOK (197 1); Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs
for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional Criteria, 1970 U. TOL.
L. REV. 321; Edwards, A New Role for the Black Law Graduates--A Reality or
an Illusion?, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1407 (1971); Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the
Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069 [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn].
12. 1970 U.S. CENSUS POPULATION, ADVANCE REPORT. See also Gellhorn, supra note
1I, at 1073.
13. Gellhorn, supra note 11, at 1073.
14. Figures on Mexican Americans who are lawyers are extremely difficult to ob-
tain. These groups tend to be the new invisible Americans and are unaccounted for. But
Vol. 49:1, 1973
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It seems that only one of two possible explanations might ac-
count for the vast underreprisentation of certain minority groups in
the practicing bar. Either American society affords them a fully equal
opportunity to become lawyers, but they do not choose careers in law;
or they would like to become lawyers, but equal opportunity does not
exist for them in society as currently structured. This lack of oppor-
tunity might be caused by overt racial prejudice or by social institu-
tions which function detrimentally to certain racial groups despite an
absence of overt racial discrimination. That both overt racial prejudice
and institutional malfunction currently exist at all levels of American
society is undeniable.16 We sense it, we feel it and we know it. The
Denver, Colorado, provides an example. There, about nine percent of the population is
Mexican American, and the city has 2,000 lawyers. However, only 10 of the 2,000 law-
yers have Spanish surnames! This is only about one-half of one percent. (U. OF DENVER
COLLEGE OF LAW, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION: LAW SCHOOL PREPARA-
TORY PROGRAM FOR COLLEGE GRADUATES OF SPANISH SPEAKING DESCENT 3 (cited in
O'Neill, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALE LJ. 699, 727 n.104 (1971)). The data for California is con-
sistent with that from Denver. See Reynoso, La Raza, The Law, and the Law Schools,
1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 809, 814-16. Mexican Americans make up about twelve percent
of California's population but less than one percent of the bar has Spanish surnames,
and while the ratio of Anglo attorneys to Anglo clients is one lawyer for every 530, the
comparable ratio for Mexican Americans is one lawyer for every 9,482. Like American
Indians and Blacks, Mexican Americans have unique social and psychological problems
that stem in great degree from their past treatment by American society. See, e.g., N.
WAGNER & M. HAUG, CHICANOS: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1971); C.
HELLER, MEXICAN AMERICAN YOUTH: FORGOTTEN YOUTH AT THE CROSSROADS (1966).
15. The situation of American Indians is even worse. There are well over half a mil-
lion Indians in the United States, located primarily in the Southwest and Northwest. As
of 1968, no American Indian had ever obtained a law degree from the Universities of
Arizona, New Mexico or Utah, and as of 1968, not one American Indian was prac-
ticing law in either New Mexico or Arizona; however, the latter two states have over
135,000 Indians! Special Scholarship Program in Law for American Indians 4, 1968
brochure, reported in O'Neill at 727 n.106, note 14 supra. During school year 1969-70,
after the creation of special affirmative action programs, there were only 71
American Indian students enrolled in all law schools in the United States. This
meager number is considered to be a great stride forward. Association of American
Law Schools Newsletter, No. 70-2, May 4, 1970, at 3. The truth is that in this country
today there are only a handful of American Indians who are lawyers. (Actually about 35
are full-blooded Indian.).
16. The complaint that analytically no violation of equal protection vests un-
less the inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false
- [W] e now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can
be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the per-
versity of a willful scheme.
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967). The Supreme Court has fre-
quently found that a state's policy, racially neutral on its face, actually denied equal
protection of the laws because it had the "effect of denying the right . . . on account of
race or color." Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 287 (1966) (the right to
vote). Under Gaston, there need not be evidence of conscious discrimination if the ef-
fect is racial exclusion. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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response by minority groups to the various affirmative action pro-
grams that voluntarily have been adopted and are currently in use by
law schools indicates that institutional malfunction accounts for vastly
more of the underrepresentation of certain minority group members
in the practicing bar than voluntary choices not to become lawyers.1 7
The use of a preferential admissions policy by a state law school
obviously raises a serious question of equal protection which differs
greatly from the type of equal protection problem raised by a local
school board when it voluntarily adopts a desegregation plan for the
common schools, even though it too uses a racial classification or ra-
cial quota. These differing types of constitutional problems are illus-
trated by considering a hypothetical and simplified school desegrega-
tion plan and comparing it with a law school preferential admissions
policy where the law school has an enrollment limitation. Imagine two
district schools of grades one through six that are located within two
blocks of each other, one attended solely by white and the other solely
by non-white children. The local school board voluntarily adopts an
affirmative action program using a racial classification requiring that
the schools-students, faculty and administration-be fully inte-
grated in proportions roughly equal to the racial group representation
in the surrounding society. 18 Assuming that after the integration oc-
curs both schools afford the constitutionally required equal educa-
tional opportunity,1 9 it can be seen that the use of the racial classifica-
tion has resulted in a net gain, and that it has imposed no constitu-
17. As a result of special admissions policies, minority enrollment has risen, and in
1971, 5,568 minority students were attending law schools, comprising three percent of
total enrollment. 1971 Survey of Minority Group Students in Legal Ed., Table I. No
one knows how many law schools use a preferential admissions system, but in 1969-70.
90 law schools accepted CLEO graduates. Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Educa-
tion: Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional
Criteria, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 326 n. 11.
18. Some states have sought to end de facto segregation voluntarily by requiring
that local school boards take the steps necessary to achieve representative racial balance
in public schools: California: by administrative regulation, see CAL. ADMIN. CODE, §§
2001, 2010-11, as cited in I U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 186 n.7 (1967): Illinois: by stutute, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122. §§ 10-21.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); Massachusetts: by statute, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71,
§§ 37C-D (Supp. 1968); New Jersey: by administrative judicial action, see Booker v.
Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965) and New York: by administrative ac-
tion, see State Commissioner of Education, Memorandum to all Chief Local
School Administrators and Presidents of Boards of Education, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 738
(1963).
19. See, e.g., Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L.
REV. 411 (1973).
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tionally cognizable detriment upon any person because of his or an-
other's race. All the children are going to school, and they are en-
joying equal educational opportunity. Therefore, the use of the racial
classification is benign.20 But in the preferential law admissions situa-
tion where applications are greater than the enrollment limitation, a
new element is present: a detriment-the denial of admission to law
school-is imposed upon an academically better qualified white appli-
cant either because of his, or another person's, race or because of
both. The purpose of this article is to explore the constitutional di-
mensions of the equal protection problem presented by a law school's
voluntary adoption of racial classifications in a preferential admissions
policy, and to do so, in part, by focusing on the recent case of De-
Funis v. Odegaard.21
I. THE LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSION POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES
Marco DeFunis, Jr., applied for admission to the law school for the
class entering in 1970 but was refused admission; he applied again in
1971, and once more was refused admission.22 Notwithstanding the
fact that he had "worked part-time 20 to 40 hours per week during
the school year," DeFunis had "graduated from the University of
Washington in June, 1970, Phi Beta Kappa and magna cum laude"
and "with an overall grade point average of 3.62 out of a possible
4.00; a junior-senior grade point average of 3.71, as calculated by the
law school, or 3.8 when you include 9 hours of straight 'A' he received
in Latin during the first quarter of his junior year in the summer of
20. I use the term "benign" to refer to a situation where the consequence of using a
racial classification imposes no detriment on anyone. There is a dispute on the proper
use of the term "benign." One author holds that a racial quota or race classification is
benign when it is part of "a system under which a fixed ratio is established . . . for the
purpose of achieving and maintining integration." Marcuse, Benign Quotas
Re-examined, 3 J. OF INTERGROUP REL. 102 (1962). See also Navasky, The Benevolent
Housing Quota, 6 How. LJ. 30 (1960); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Pro-
tection and the "Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963). Nevertheless,
a court has defined a "benign" quota in housing by referring only to the proportion of
Blacks in the surrounding community and not to the "tipping point." Lakewood Homes
v. Bd. of Adjustment, 258 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio C.P. 1970), modified, 267 N.E.2d 595
(1971).
21. 82Wn. 2d 11,507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
22. Id. at 13, 507 P.2d at 1172. He spent school year 1970-71 in graduate school.
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1968."23 In 1971, he also presented "24 hours of graduate school
courses, in which, at the time of his application, he had received 21
hours of 'A' and three hours of incomplete, while working 36 or more
hours per week for the Seattle Park Department." 24 He had taken the
Law School Admission Test (LSAT) administered by the Educational
Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, three times, receiving scores
of 512, 566 and 668 which the law school averaged out to 582, and
he received average writing test component scores of 62, 58 and 64,
which the law school averaged to 61.25 For DeFunis, as for all other
applicants, the "junior-senior undergraduate grade point average" and
the LSAT scores "were combined through a formula to yield a pre-
dicted first-year of [sic] law school grade average for the applicant. '2 6
DeFunis' predicted first-year average (PFYA) was 76.23.27
The law school had established a committee on admissions and
readmissions to determine who shall be admitted, 28 and for purposes
of selecting the entering class of 1971 the faculty of the law school
expanded the membership of the committee to five faculty members
and two student members29 each member having an equal vote. To
the dissenters in DeFunis, this faculty action raised a substantial ques-
tion of whether it is wise or legally proper to place "a controlling
power over the careers and even the lives of many potential students
in the hands of their fellow students." 30
In 1971, the law school received 1,601 applications for admission
to the first-year class31 and almost all of the 1,601 applicants were
fully qualified for the study of law. However, Washington's Legisla-
ture had previously imposed an overall maximum limitation of stu-
dent enrollment on the University of Washington, and under "the uni-
23. Trial Court Findings of Fact Nos. IV, V & VI: Superior Court of the State of
Washington for King County, Honorable Lloyd Shorett, Judge.
24. Id., Finding of Fact No. XII.
25. 82 Wn. 2d at 17, 507 P.2d at 1173. The LSAT score of 668 is within the top
seven percent of all law school applicants in the past several years. The averaging of
the scores is "done to offset a learning effect which statistical studies by the Educational
Testing Service indicate occurs as the result of the multiple taking of the test." Id. at
16, 507 P.2d at 1173.
26. Id. at 16, 507 P.2d at 1173. The Law School grades on a numerical system which
can be broken into letter grades roughly as follows: 44 to 59 = F; 60 to 67 = D; 68 to
76 = C; 77 to 84 = B, and 85 and above = A.
27. Id. at 16, 507 P.2d at 1173.
28. Id. at 14, 507 P.2d at 1172.
29. Id. at 15, 507 P.2d at 1172.
30. Id. at 54, 507 P.2d at 1194 (Hale, J., dissenting).
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versity's enrollment limitation there were only 445 positions allotted
to the law school, and of these the number available for the first-year
class was between 145 and 150."32 Thus, under these conditions the
law school was forced to use some kind of preferential admission pol-
icy, there being no possible way to admit all the qualified applicants.
The response of the law school's Committee on Admission and Read-
mission was to apply not one or two admission preferences, but at
least four.
The first preference was based almost exclusively on the PFYAs.
The "committee decided that most promising applicants ...would
be defined as applicants with predicted first-year law school averages
over 77. '33- Therefore, all "applicants with PFYAs above 77 were
reviewed and decided on by the full committee as soon as they came
in, in order to reach an early decision as to the acceptance of such
students. '34 Next, a set of negative "preferences" was administered.
With two automatic exceptions--certain minority groups and return-
ing servicemen applicants-all "applicants with PFYAs below 74.5
were reviewed by the chairman of the committee and were either re-
jected by him or placed in a group for later review by the full com-
mittee. '35 A third set of preferences was automatically given to all
"persons who [applied immediately after discharge and who] had
been previously admitted but who were unable to enter or forced to
withdraw from the law school because of inductions into the military
service . ."36 Further consideration of all remaining applicants in-
cluding those with PFYAs between 74.5 and 76.99, including DeFunis,
was delayed until after the passage of the date on which applications
would no longer be received for the class entering in 1971. This group
constitutes the group of "delayed" applicants.
When considering the applications upon which action had been
delayed, 37 the committee gave a fourth set of admission preferences to
some but not all applicants who were "Black Americans, Chicano
Americans, American Indians, and Philippine Americans," but not to
31. Id. at 15, 507 P.2dat 1172.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17, 507 P.2d at 1173.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The serviceman preference has been dropped.
37. I.e., those over 77 or under 74.5 who for some reason had been neither accepted
nor rejected and all those between 74.5 and 76.99.
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"Oriental Americans." All of the minority group applicants with
PFYAs below 77 were considered on an individual basis by the com-
mittee along with all the remaining applicants, most of whom had
PFYAs ranging from 74.5 to 76.99. "In selecting the applicants from
this narrow range, the committee used the process described in its
Guide for Applicants, a copy of which was sent to all applicants:" 38
We below describe the process we applied to determine the class
that entered the University of Washington School of Law in Sep-
tember 1970. We anticipate that the same process will be applied in
determining membership in the class of 197 1.
We received about 1025 applications for the approximately 160
seats available for the 1970 class. Because of the uncertainties of the
draft and because many students apply to several schools, we accepted
288 applicants to fill the 160 seats.
In assessing applications, we began by trying to identify appli-
cants who had the potential for outstanding performance in law school.
We attempted to select applicants for admission from that group on
the basis of their ability to make significant contributions to law school
classes and to the community at large.
We gauged the potential for outstanding performance in law school
not only from the existence of high test scores and grade point aver-
ages, but also from careful analysis of recommendations, the quality
of work in difficult analytical seminars, courses, and writing programs,
the academic standards of the school attended by the applicant, the
applicant's graduate work (if any), and the nature of the applicant's
employment (if any), since graduation.
An applicant's ability to make significant contributions to law school
classes and the community at large was assessed from such factors as
his extracurricular and community activities, employment, and general
background.
We gave no preference to, but did not discriminate against, either
Washington residents or women in making our determinations. An ap-
plicant's racial or ethnic background was considered as one factor in
our general attempt to convert formal credentials into realistic predic-
tions.3 9
38. 82 Wn. 2d at 18, 507 P.2d at 1174.
39. Admissions Council, Guide for Applicants, University of Washington School of
Law (197 1). The first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of the quoted material
appear in DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 16, 18-19, 507 P.2d at 1173-74. "The class [entering in
1970] had the following make-up: Total size 163; Number of women 20; Number of
minority students 19; Age-Range 20 to 48, Median 24; Jr.-Sr. Grade Point Average
Vol. 49:1, 1973
DeFunis v. Odegaard
This attempt at definition by the committee is laudable, but a
failure. The Guide is clearly incomplete and inaccurate. It implies that
it applies to all applicants equally, but it mentions nothing about two
of at least four of the admission preferences-those preferences
applying to applicants with PFYAs over 77 and those applying to re-
turning servicemen who promptly reapply for admission. More impor-
tantly, one can see that any attempt to apply the "rules" that are
stated in the Guide necessarily leads to purely subjective and even in-
tuitive considerations being decisive in admissions. For example, when
gauging "the potential for outstanding performance," the committee
considered "the quality of [an applicant's] work in difficult analytical
seminars, courses and writing programs, the academic standards of
the school attended by the applicant . . . and the nature of the ap-
plicant's employment (emphasis added) . . . ." It is a mystery how
an admissions committee can have a sufficiently precise knowledge to
judge and to rank objectively all of the jobs existing in the country
and then to determine which among them gives an applicant "the po-
tential for outstanding performance. in law school," especially without
any indication40 whether the applicant did his job well or poorly.
Likewise, one is skeptical in the extreme that the law school's Admis-
sion Committee can have current and objective knowledge of all the
"seminars, courses and writing programs" that are offered by all of
the nation's colleges and universities, let alone be in a position to
judge and rank their "difficulty" or their "analytical" qualities and
then to decide upon their contributions to the 1,601 law applicants'
"potential for outstanding performance in law school." These same
considerations apply to judgments made about the "academic stan-
dards of the school attended by the applicant." Moreover, one won-
ders whether any admissions committee can have the competence nec-
essary to weigh, objectively and comprehensively, a law applicant's
"extracurricular and community activities, employment and general
background, and then assess their contribution to the "applicant's
ability to make significant contributions to law school classes and the
community at large (emphasis added) .... " These are sonorous
Median 3.37; Law School Admission Test Score Median 637, Writing Test Median 61."
Guide for Applicants supra (not quoted in DeFunis).
40. The law school conducted no interview, nor provided any space on its applica-
tion forms from which it could determine how capably the applicant had performed his
job.
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words that appear in the Guide for Applicants, but they merely mas-
querade as rules. They are not rules at all. They simply cannot be fol-
lowed, and they do not guide. They invite and demand subjective
judgments, probably based on intuition, rumor, hearsay or prejudice,
which are not saved from errant subjectivity when the decisions are
made by a majority vote in a committee composed of five faculty
members and two students. Moreover, these "rules" provide no guid-
ance on the composite way in which each of the factors should be
weighed and combined in relation to all others when making the
overall and final judgment on a candidate. In this situation, subjective
and intuitive factors necessarily must enter, perhaps decisively, into
law admissions decisions.
These subjective considerations clearly played a significant role in
some law admissions and denials of admission, and the use of such
subjective considerations raises a serious question of fairness under
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.41 Another considera-
tion makes it more serious. The burdens of the law school's preferen-
tial admissions policies were not borne equally by each of the 1,601
applicants, but almost solely by applicants having PFYAs in that
narrow range between 76.99 and 74.5. Prima facie, this allocation of
the burden of a preferential admissions policy appears arbitrary and
unfair, and no explanation is given for it. Applying the administrative
law standard of review42 Washington's Supreme Court upheld the law
41. Dissenting judges complained about the subjectivity and the lack of clear stan-
dards stating that:
Of the approximately 150 students actually enrolled in the class for which peti-
tioner DeFunis made his application, only some 42 admission files were placed in
evidence. But an inspection of these files, in my judgment, fails to show any con-
sistent policy on admissions at which a prelaw student could aim his career. If he is
intelligent, works hard, and achieves high grades, his place in the law school class
may be preempted by someone with lesser grades but who is engaged in what is
described as 'community activities', or is otherwise described as a student activist.
Or, if he is engaged in community activities and still attains high grades through
diligence and intelligence and long hours at the books, his position may be taken in
the entering class by one who has neither engaged in 'community activity' nor
achieved high grades but, nevertheless, has made a high LSAT score. Or, even if he
studied hard, is intelligent, and placed high in grades, LSAT and PFYA, and en-
gaged in what are called community activities, his place might still be awarded to a
minority student who has done none of these. All of these inequities are, I fear,
bound to foster a spirit of anti-intellectualism in the heart of what should be an in-
tellectual center.
82 Wn. 2d at 59-60, 507 P.2d at 1196 (Hale & Hunter, JJ., dissenting).
42. The evolving doctrine is that administrative agencies making discretionary
judgments that allocate rights, duties, offices or social and economic benefits must make
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school's practice, holding that it did "not agree that the exercise of
judgment in evaluating an applicant's file constitutes arbitrary and
capricious action. Nor do we find an abuse of that judgment here. '43
My concern in this article is not to explore the ramifications of the due
those discretionary judgments in accordance with "ascertainable standards." See, e.g.,
Holmes v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972). In De-
Funis, a majority of the court expressed concern about the lack of standards. Three jus-
tices concurred specifically "to point out the desirability of more complete published
standards for admission." 82 Wn. 2d at 45, 507 P.2d at 1189. Two dissenting justices
held that there was a fatal lack of standards and no "consistent policy on admissions at
which a prelaw student could aim his career." Id. at 59, 507 P.2d at 1196. Thus five
judges, a majority of the court, expressed serious concern about the adequacy of the Law
School's standards.
43. 82 Wn. 2d at 40, 507 P.2d at 1186,. The majority opinion upholds the Law
School's action, but the dissent states:
In general, it is a fair summary of the record, I think, that of the approximately 70
files distributed to each committee member, an applicant neither included in the 10
recommended nor in some 20 more carried as secondary possibilities had little or
no chance for admission.
Id. at 54, 507 P.2d at 1194.
There is also a curious aura of civil, political or community 'activism,' as it is
sometimes called, surrounding the recommendatioris for admission or rejection.
One student applicant recommended by [a student committee member] had an
LSAT of 562, substantially lower than the average of Mr. DeFunis, but was recom-
mended for the waiting list because of being very active on campus and in his
community. The activity which impressed her the most was that he was a founding
member of Isla Vista Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union and president
of its student chapter at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He had partic-
ipated in the John Tunney for Senate campaign in California and in the operation
of a student owned and operated radio station in Santa Barbara. Also, the appli-
cant had been a campus news reporter and a member of several other campus or-
ganizations. . . . She recommended, however, against the admission of another
student with a 3.9 junior-senior grade average because she did not think that his
area of study, the field of finance, adequately significant [sic]. Finance, as she put
it, was a program without rigor. She was apparently unaware of the rigorous nature
of courses in accountancy, statistics, economics and banking as taught at the Uni-
versity of Washington.
Id. at 55-56, 507 P.2d at 1194.
A random examination of the records of various students accepted by the law
school in the entering classes for which Mr. DeFunis had applied shows extraordi-
nary and inexplicable variations in their qualifications. One admitted applicant
showed an almost vertical acedemic climb. He had a junior-senior grade point av-
erage of 3.64, but an overall grade point average of 2.85. The admission committee
notes in his file read as follows: 'Overall GPA 2.85. strange recommend. "arrogant,
conceited" but apparently bright ... [not readable] Take a chance on his screwy
personality & admit.' His PFYA was 78.35 with a writing score of 71. One cannot
discern from the files whether a heightened community or campus activity, or what-
ever, constituted the determining factor for admission. One young woman with ajunior-senior GPA of 3, an LSAT of 702, and a writing score of 66, was admitted
by a letter from the dean dated September 14, 1971, with no comment, remark or
recommendation whatever from the admissions council.
An applicant with a junior-senior GPA of 2.37 and an LSAT score of 475,
was admitted by letter from the associate dean dated July 29, 1971, despite the
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process problem, nor to assess whether the Washington Supreme
Court's application of its administrative law rule was proper. 44 Never-
theless, I respectfully dissent from the court's due process holding
because, as I have pointed out above, there were probably neither
accurate, clear nor followable "rules" or "guides" for judgment by the
committee. Even if there were, it is doubtful whether they actually
prevailed in all cases, as revealed by the cavalier actions of the deans45
and the results obtained by the committee. 46 It should be clear that ex-
cept for the way in which the burden is distributed, none of these due
process considerations is relevant to the constitutional validity of a
carefully constructed and executed affirmative action program favoring
minority group admissions.
The actual admissions decisions on all the delayed applications
were made by the Admissions Committee by first giving "[e] ach
member of the committee, including student members, . . .approx-
remarks of the admissions committee that he be rejected. An applicant with a
junior-senior GPA of 3.32, an LSAT of 759, and a writing score of 60 was
admitted by letter of July 23, 1971, from the associate dean of the law school
despite the admissions committee's remarks set forth in his file that his 'recom-
mendations are equivocal and his academic career unimpressive.' The admissions
council deemed unimpressive a 3.32 junior-senior average earned in chemistry.
physics, analytical geometry, calculus and general physics laboratory. This par-
ticular applicant with the so-called unimpressive academic record had also earned
6 hours of A in advanced calculus, 6 hours of A in mechanics and an A in
introduction to digital computers.
Id. at 57-58. 507 P.2d at 1195-96.
[Another applicant had] a junior-senior grade point average of 2.63, an LSAT of
481, and a writing score of 55. The file shows that she was 35 years of age at the
time of admission and would thus be 38 upon graduation, if indeed able to com-
plete the program on schedule. The remarks entered by the admissions council in
her file note that she was 'Divorced with five kids. Could make it if her personal sit-
uation could be worked out.' It added, 'Excellent recommendations; sound record.'
and upon these conclusions recommended admission to the law school.
Id. at 58, 507 P.2d at 1196.
44. Nor the question whether a preference must be given to Washington residents.
45. A substantial question of "due process" fairness arises from various actions
taken by the Deans; for example, according to the dissent, 33 days after DeFunis had
received the letter denying him admission on August 2, 1973. "one young woman with a
junior-senior GPA of 3, an LSAT of 702, and a writing score of 66, was admitted by a
letter from the dean dated September 14, 1971, with no comment, remark or recom-
mendation whatever from the admissions council." 82 Wn. 2d at 58, 507 P.2d at 1195.
"An applicant with a junior-senior GPA of 2.37 and an LSAT score of 475 was ad-
mitted by letter from the associate dean dated July 29, 1971, despite the remarks of the
admissions committee that he be rejected." Id. "Another applicant earned a remarkably
high junior-senior GPA of 3.90 and scored 599 in the LSAT, but achieved a writing
score of only 46. He was notified of his acceptance by letter September 14, 1971, by the
dean of the law school" 33 days after DeFunis received his rejection letter. Id. at 59. 507
P.2d at 1196.
46. See discussion in notes 41 and 43 supra.
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imately 70 [randomly selected] files upon which to make recommen-
dation for admission or rejection, with instructions that only about 10
were to be approved for admission [and] ...20 more carried as
secondary possibilities. '47 The law school's committee added an addi-
tional number of applicants and ranked Marco DeFunis, Jr. in such a
position that he and 152 other applicants were notified that they had
not been rejected outright, but that they had been placed on a waiting
list. This list was divided into quartiles with'DeFunis located in the
lowest quartile. On August 2, 1971, DeFunis was notified "that he was
neither admitted nor any longer on the waiting list."48 "Of those mi-
vited [to attend law school], 74 had lower PFYAs than [did DeFunis] ; 6
36 of these were minority applicants, 22 were returning from military
service, and 16 were applicants judged by the committee as deserving
invitations on the basis of other information contained in their files, '49 0
After he received notification that he would not be admitted, DeFunis
brought suit. The trial court held in his favor, reading Brown v. Board
of Education5o as holding that the Constitution's. equal protection
clause is color-blind, that all racial classifications are per se uncon-
stitutional, and that the law school's use of a racial criterion when
giving admissions preferences "discriminated against [DeFunis] and
did not accord to him equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution . . .,51
Washington's Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the equal pro-
tection issue.52
The exact use which the law school made of its racial classification
should be noted. Under the law school's policy, although "race was a
47. 82 Wn. 2d at 54, 507 P.2d at 1193. (The committee reviewed each file.).
48. Id. at 22, 507 P.2d at 1176.
49. Id.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11, Remedy).
51. 82 Wn. 2d at 23, 507 P.2d at 1177. The court also noted:
The trial court found that some minority applicants with college grades and
LSAT scores so low that had they been of the white race their applications would
have been summarily denied, were given invitations for admission; that some such
students were admitted instead of plaintiff; that since no more than 150 applicants
were to be admitted to the law school, the admission of less qualified students re-
sulted in a denial of places to those better qualified; and that plaintiff had better
'qualifications' than many of the students admitted by the committee. The trial
court also found that plaintiff was and is fully qualified and capable of satisfacto-
rily attending the law school.
Id. at 22-23, 507 P.2d at 1176-77.
52. The state supreme court let stand the trial court's further rulings that DeFunis
had standing to sue, and that no preference must be given to residential over non-resi-
dential applicants. Id. at 23-24, 507 P.2d at 1177.
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major factor, it was not the only factor considered by the committee,"
and "no minority quota was established; rather, a reasonable repre-
sentation of such groups in the law school was sought."53 On the other
hand, "although the same standard was applied to all applicants (i.e.,
the relative probability of the individual's succeeding in law school),
minority applicants were directly compared to one another, but were not
compared to applicants outside the minority group."5 4 Moreover,
Asian Americans "were not treated as 'minority' applicants for admis-
sions purposes since a significant number could be admitted on the
same basis as general applicants." 55 Although strict quotas were not
used, I conclude that the law school's policy gave a decisive or abso-
lute preference on racial grounds to minority applicants believed by
the admissions committee to present the requisite probability of suc-
cess in law school. The question is whether such a decisive preference
is constitutional under the equal protection clause.
II. STANDING
On appeal, Washington's Supreme Court was confronted with the
threshold argument that DeFunis failed to present the necessary
standing to sue. The law school argued that its Admission Commit-
tee's evaluation of DeFunis had placed him on its waiting list in the
last quartile with at least 120 applicants ahead of him; that only 36
minority applicants had been admitted; that therefore DeFunis would
not have been admitted even if the law school had no preferential
admissions policy; and that therefore DeFunis had no standing to sue.56
The court correctly rejected the law school's argument. If the law
school's argument had prevailed, a wrongfully denied applicant would
have no standing to sue unless he could overcome the impossible
burden of showing that he, of all those denied admission, would have
been admitted but for the admission of a certain number of minority
group members. Because of this burden, the law school could easily
place itself beyond the reach of judicial review and the Constitution by
the simple expedients of not using a waiting list and by denying ad-
mission outright to all persons except those accepted. There is another
53. Id. at 39, 507 P.2d at 1185.
54. Id. at 21, 507 P.2d at 1175. (This smacks of a quota.).
55. Id. at 18, 507 P.2d at 1174 n.3.
56. Id. at 23-24, 507 P.2d at 1177.
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vital flaw in the law school's position. The argument surely has no
proper application to applicants who were placed by the law school
on its waiting list. By placing DeFunis on its admissions waiting list,
rather than rejecting him outfight, the law school gave him a contin-
gent interest. It had fully approved all substantive aspects of his ad-
mission; admission was to be contingent solely on the decisions of
those applicants whom the law school itself had placed ahead of him
on the waiting list. There was no way for the law school or DeFunis to
know how many of the applicants posted ahead of DeFunis would
decline invitations to attend. It was possible that all applicants ahead
of DeFunis would decline, and that he would be the first waiting list
applicant admitted. This contingent interest alone should have given
him standing. Moreover, the law school itself placed DeFunis in the
last quartile. It would be anomalous indeed to accept the law school's
argument and to allow the school's placing of DeFunis in a particular
position on its waiting list to deny him standing to litigate the very
question of whether the law school had properly placed him. Further-
more, there can be no doubt of the actual adverseness of the parties in
this case. Washington's Supreme Court correctly ruled that DeFunis'
"interest in this litigation clearly constitutes the requisite 'personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' necessary to request an adju-
dication of the merits of this case. '57
III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES
The school desegregation decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States are relevant to some aspects of DeFunis and irrelevant
to others. Because they adjudicate a different kind of equal protection
question, the school desegregation decisions are not dispositive of the
equal protection issue presented by DeFunis. The desegregation deci-
sions are most immediately relevant to the holding of the trial court
which relied exclusively on Brown v. Board of Education,58 reading
that case to hold that the equal protection clause required the states to
57. Id. at 24, 507 P.2d at 1177. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Ass'n of Data Processing v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970). Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
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be color-blind, that any racial classification used by the law school
was per se unconstitutional, and that therefore, "a state law school can
never consider race as one criterion in its selection of first year stu-
dents." 59 This reading of Brown is incorrect. An incomplete but cor-
rect statement of the holding of Brown I and Brown 1160 which ac-
counts for what was said and done in those cases and squares with
subsequent holdings by the United States Supreme Court would read:
A state has no constitutional power to operate a dual school system for
whites and non-whites by assigning students to schools on the basis of
their race, thereby imposing a detriment on the minority group students
by segregating and stigmatizing them, and where an attempt has been
made by a state to operate such a dual system, it must convert that
system into a unitary, non-racially segregated system of public education.
The question put to the Court in Brown was: "Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive
the children of the minority group of equal educational opportuni-
ties?"61 The Supreme Court answered this question by stating that
"[s] eparate education facilities are inherently unequal," and "we con-
clude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place." 62 From these two quotations alone one might
conclude that Brown's holding was that the equal protection clause
required that a state be color blind "in the field of education."
Brown's holding, however, cannot be distilled from these two quo-
tations alone. In the paragraph immediately preceeding the quota-
tions, the Supreme Court commented on the deleterious effects of seg-
regation. It rejected the state's argument that the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessey should be extended to the field of education be-
59. 82 Wn. 2d at 25-26, 507 P.2d at 1178. See also Bittker, The Case of the
Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L. J. 1387, 1392
(1962). The notion that the constitution is color-blind derives from the First Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); cf. Cummings v. Bd.
of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). If strictly applied the color-blind theory would disallow
racial distinctions in the census. See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 575 (1965). It might be noted that the
term "race" appears but once in the Constitution; in the fifteenth and not the fourteenth
amendment.
60. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
61. 347 U.S. at 493.
62. Id. at 495.
63. In Sweatt v. Painter [339 U.S. 629 (1950)] .upra, in finding that a segre-
gated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportu-
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cause the effects of the doctrine were believed to be inherently stigma-
tizing, stamping minority children with a badge of inferiority. 63 There-
fore, the doctrine was detrimental to the education and welfare of
minority group children and resulted in invidious discrimination.
Washington's Supreme Court correctly observed 64 that Brown does
not hold that the equal protection clause requires that a state law
school be color-blind in its admissions policy, nor does it hold that all
racial classifications in the field of education are per se unconstitu-
tional. Brown's holding in this regard is that only those racial classifi-
cations used by a state that have the effect of stigmatizing and im-
posing detriments on a racial group in the field of education are invid-
ious and thus violate the equal protection clause. On this analysis,
Brown leaves open the question presented by DeFunis: Whether race
can be a constitutionally valid criterion for admission to a state law
school if the law school's purpose and the effect of its policy is not to
stigmatize or segregate but partially to rectify and ameliorate the con-
sequences of racial segregation by effectively affording equal educa-
tional opportunity to certain minority group members where pre-
viously it did not exist, notwithstanding the admitted detriment im-
posed on certain displaced non-minority group applicants.
nities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In Me-
Laurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 [1950], . . . supra, the Court,
in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all
other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational
opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction ofihe
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the in-
feriority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a racial [ly] integrated school system."
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but
equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
347 U.S. at 493-95.
64. 82 Wn. 2d at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179.
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In summary, the school desegregation cases are relevant to the
equal protection question presented by DeFunis only because they do
not preclude the law school from using a racial criterion in its admis-
sion policy nor do they hold that the constitution is color-blind in
every educational situation. The school desegregation cases are irrele-
vant in the sense that they do not expressly authorize the law school's
admission policy. Constitutional criteria additional to those found in
the school desegregation cases are needed to resolve the equal protec-
tion question presented by DeFunis.
IV. CURRENT USES OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
Before directly discussing the equal protection question in DeFunis,
it will prove illuminating first to consider authorities other than school
desegregation cases that have upheld uses of a racial classification.
Racial classifications currently are used by the federal government. 65
The President by executive order66 and the Congress by legislation
have used racial classifications in various affirmative action programs.
For example, Congress has enacted a measure requiring that hiring
preferences be given to American Indians by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 67 Indeed, Congressional classification by race is most clearly
evident in regard to American Indians. Congress has enacted compre-
hensive legislation governing almost all aspects of a reservation Indi-
an's life including matters of education, 68 health, 69 civil liberties, 70
welfare,7 ' transfer of land, 72 validity of contracts, 73 testamentary
65. Immigration quotas based on race and/or national origin have long been used in
order to preserve a desired racial balance in the United States population. See, e.g., C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1967); M.
KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946); Boudin, The Settler
Within our Gates, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 266 (195 1); Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the
Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: Tile Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578
(1959); Note, Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 643 (1953); Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 547
(1953).
66. See notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text supra.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
68. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
69. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (permits entry to reservations to enforce health
regulations).
70. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970).
71. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-09a (1970).
72. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 391,393 (1970).
73. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 81, 82, 82a, 84 (1970) (limiting power to contract
without prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior).
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dispositions74 and expenditures of tribal funds.75 The category "Amer-
ican Indian" has been held to be a racial classification; indeed, "Indians
can only be defined by their race. '7 6
It is unlikely in the extreme that any court would hold that Con-
gress failed to present a compelling and overriding interest justifying
its use of the racial classification in these statutes. A three-judge fed-
eral court has upheld Congress' use of this racial classification, and its
decision was affirmed, per curiam, by the Supreme Court in Simmons
v. Eagle Seelatsee.77 The case involved the rights of inheritance of the
children and grandchildren of an enrolled member of the Yakima
tribe who had died. Under the law of the State of Washington the
children and grandchildren qualified to inherit certain interests of the
deceased in Yakima Indian allotments on the Yakima Indian reserva-
tion. But the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to Congressional stat-
ute,78 ruled that the deceased's children and grandchildren failed to
qualify for inheritance because of their inability to meet the federal
statutory requirement of "one-fourth or more blood" of the Yakima
tribe. The purpose of Congress' statute was analogous to that of the
law school's policy in DeFunis. Congress used a racial classification in
order to confer the benefit of inheritance only upon those natural heirs
who were "of one-fourth or more [Indian] blood" while denying that
benefit and imposing the detriment of inability to inherit on all other
natural heirs of an enrolled Indian. By this statute, Congress grants a
74. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1970) (requiring approval of Secretary of Inte-
rior for certain kinds of testamentary dispositions).
75. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
76. "If legislation is to deal with Indians at all, the very reference to them implies
the use of a 'criterion of race.' Indians can only be defined by their race." Simmons v.
Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 (E.D. Wash. 1965) (three-judge court), affd per
curiam, 384 U.S. 209 (1966); see also Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir.
1971) (upholding classification of Indians by race).
It should be noted that the Court has also upheld a wartime classification based on
Japanese ancestry in the infamous case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). See Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE LJ. 489
(1945).
77. Cited in note 76 supra.
78. Act of August 9, 1946, ch. 933, § 7.60 Stat. 969, as amended 25 U.S.C. § 607
(1970), provides:
Hereafter [after August 9, 1946] only enrolled members of the Yakima Tribes of
one-fourth or more blood of such tribes shall take by inheritance or by will any in-
terest in that part of the restricted or trust estate of a deceased member of such
tribes which came to the decedent through his membership in such tribes or which
consists of any interest in or the rents, issues, or profits from an allotment of land
within the Yakima Reservation or within the area ceded by the treaty of June 9,
1855 (12 Stat. 951).
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preference to a racially defined minority group at the expense of
non-minority group members. The statute was attacked in part on the
ground that it "is unconstitutional because it is based on a criterion
of race contrary to the [due process provision] of the Fifth
Amendment . . . . 79 The Simmons court upheld its constitutional
validity, appearing to have distinguished the beneficial effects of the
racial classification for the preferred Indian minority group from the
deleterious effects caused by use of the racial classification in the
school segregation situation. The court held that Congress' use of the
racial classification in this "case has no resemblance to Bolling v. Sharpe.80
• . . where the segregation of pupils, by race, in public schools
was held a violation of the Fifth Amendment. '81
Porcelli v. Titus,82 like Eagle Seelatsee, is directly analogous to
DeFunis. In Porcelli a state rule was involved. A group of white per-
sons challenged a local school board's abolition of its regular proce-
dures and promotion schedules for principals and vice-principals and
the substitution of a racially conditioned policy giving priority to cer-
tain Black candidates in order to increase their number and status in
the school system. The United States Court of Appeals upheld the ac-
tion of the local board, stating that "[s] tate action based on consider-
ations of color, when color is not used per se, and in furtherance of a
proper governmental objective, is not necessarily a violation of the
fourteenth amendment," 83 notwithstanding the fact that a clear detri-
ment was imposed on the white candidates on racial grounds. Simi-
larly, in the context of general employment, another United States
Court of Appeals held in Carter v. Gallagher8 4 that "it would be in
order for the district court to mandate that one out of every three per-
sons hired by the [Minneapolis] Fire Department would be a mi-
nority individual who qualifies until at least 20 minority persons have
79. Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (E.D. Wash. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 209 (1966). The argument against use of the racial classifica-
tion was based on the federal school desegregation case, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). where the Court held that with respect to the federal government "Classifica-
tions based solely on race must be scrutinized with particular care. since they are con-
trary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." Id. at 499.
80. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
81. Simmons, 244 F. Supp. at 815.
82. 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
83. Id. at 1257.
84. 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
accord, United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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been so hired," notwithstanding the fact that in doing so a more quali-
fied but non-minority candidate might have the detriment of being
bypassed imposed upon him.
A state's use of a racial classification for record-keeping purposes
was upheld in Hamm v. Virginia Board of Elections85 which was af-
firmed per curiam by the Supreme Court. Virginia's statute required
that racial designations appear on its voting, property tax assessment
and divorce records. The court held that "the designation of race, just
as sex or religious denomination, may in certain records serve a useful
purpose, and the procurement of such information by state authorities
cannot be outlawed per se."'8 6 The court then upheld Virginia's statute
requiring racial record keeping relating to divorce because "the se-
curing and chronicling of racial data for identification or statistical
use violates no constitutional privilege. 87 However, it struck down
Virginia's statutes relating to voting and property taxes because they
required segregation of the records according to race and served "no
other purpose than to classify and distinguish official records on the
basis of race or color. 88
In Anderson v. Martin,89 the Supreme Court disallowed an identi-
fying racial classification in a voting context and "concluded that the
compulsory designation by Louisiana of the race of the candidate on
the ballot operates as a discrimination against appellants [minority
group members] and is therefore violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause."90 "The vice," the Court said, "lies
not in the resulting injury [to minority group members] but in the
placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that
induces racial prejudice at the polls."91
All the school desegregation cases, and the authorities discussed
above, shed light on the constitutional requirements a state must meet
when using a racial classification. These authorities consistently hold
the following: (1) that a link exists between the use of a racial classifi-
85. 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiain, Tancil
v. Wools, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
86. Id. at 158. The federal government collects racial statistics during its census tak-
ings.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
90. Id. at 401-02.
91. Id. at 402.
Washington Law Review
cation and its effect; (2) that constitutionally the equal protection
clause's usual prohibition of racial classifications must be understood
in terms of the effects achieved by that classification; (3) that it is the
effect of the classification (desegregation, production of equal educa-
tional opportunity, production of racial prejudice, etc.) that governs a
court's decision on the validity of a state's racial classification; (4) that
a court must judge whether the effects of a classification are invidious;
(5) that the effects of a racial classification are invidious and the
classification unconstitutional if a racial group is stigmatized thereby
or if it has a detriment imposed upon it; and (6) that a racial
classification is not unconstitutional nor are its effects invidious if its
use is in furtherance of a proper governmental objective-e.g., ex-
tending equal educational opportunity without denying it to anyone-
and its effect is to ameliorate and correct the effects of past racial dis-
crimination; (7) that a racial classification need not be authorized by
the prior decision of a court: "That there may be no constitutional
duty to act to undo de facto segregation, however, does not mean that
such action is unconstitutional," even if it is achieved by a state's vol-
untary use of an explicit racial classification. 92 Three of the cases-
Eagle Seelatsee, Porcelli and Carter-are directly relevant to DeFunis
in that they uphold the use of a racial classification for the purpose of
granting a preference to a minority group member, even where its ef-
fect is to impose a clear detriment on a non-minority group member.
V. THE FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION
Brown and the above cases illuminate and identify the framework
for decision in DeFunis. This framework can be best understood as an
expression of the theories of justice richly described by Aristotle.93
Brown I and its progeny go to the general notion of distributive justice
and Brown II and its progeny to the notion of compensatory justice;
both concepts of justice, like the equal protection clause itself, are
closely connected to the problem of equality in human life. Distribu-
tive justice consists of the type of justice usually meted out by a legis-
lature when it distributes rights, duties, offices, honors or goods in the
92. Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967).
93. ARISTOTLE. POLITICS, Book III, ch. 11, § 19 (Oxford ed. E. Barker transl.
1946) [hereinafter cited as POLITICS]. Justice, for Aristotle, necessarily involved some
sort of equality.
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first instance to members of the community. The legislature must ac-
complish this distribution in accordance with the principle of propor-
tionate equality.9 4 The legislature may thus take account of reason-
able or natural differences in humans, where it can be shown that they
exist naturally, but if they cannot be shown clearly to exist naturally,
then the legislature must treat natural equals equally. 95 In effect, the
Court has interpreted the concept of legal equality expressed in the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to correspond to Aris-
totelian notions of distributive justice. In particular, equal protection
is construed to in6 orporate the requirement of proportionality, which
guarantees that all naturally equal persons must be afforded equal
access to state awarded benefits and opportunities, such as the oppor-
tunity to receive a legal education at a state law school.96
Distributive justice was not afforded by Southern legislatures
during slavery, nor later under the separate but equal doctrine. These
legislatures were engaged in distributing rights, duties, offices and
goods on the basis of "race," which is a classification of "convenience"
and not a distinction existing in nature among human beings. It is an
unnatural or unreasonable classification. Recognizing this, the Su-
preme Court held, in effect, in Brown I that the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy constituted a violation of the basic principle of dis-
tributive justice under the equal protection clause because, since "sep-
arate educational facilities are inherently unequal," it improperly al-
lowed legislatures to award educational rights, duties, goods and
94. Aristotle differentiated distributive from corrective justice, distributive justice
having as its goal the attainment of geometrical rather than arithmetic equality. He de-
scribed geometrical (or proportionate) equality in terms of a mathematical construct.
Four terms, he noted, are required for the equation. If "A" and "B" represent the respec-
tive merits of two persons and "a" and "b" their respective shares of the goods to be dis-
tributed, then the goods will be distributed justly if the distribution satisfies the equation
A:B =a:b. The ratio between shares is equal to the ratio between merits. (By illustra-
tion, if one flute player is twice as proficient as another, the principles of distributive
justice would allow him to receive the flute which is of twice the quality as the other.
POLITICS, supra note 93, Book III, ch. 12.).
By analogy with a geometrical series (e.g., 1, 3, 9, 27, .. .-3n), in which each term
bears an identical ratio to the term preceding it, the Greeks called this proportionate
equality a "geometrical equality." ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, ch. 3
(Loeb ed. 1934). On the other hand, Aristotle observed, corrective justice requires an
equation using only two terms: retaining the same symbols, a= b. This simple equation
is an "arithmetic equality." Id., Book V, ch. 4.
95. POLITICS, supra note 93, Book III, ch. 9, § 15.
96. For a discussion of equal opportunity, see Dalimayr, Functionalism, Justice and
Equality, 78 ETHICS 1 (1967); Plamenatz, Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality,
in EQUALITY, NoMos IX, 79,91 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1967); Schaar, Equality of
Opportunity, and Beyond, id. at 228 and J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (197 1).
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honors unequally to children who are by and large equal in educa-
tional ability. Stated another way the Court held, inter alia, that legis-
latures cannot distribute opportunities for education unequally on the
basis of an immutable but unscientific characteristic-"race"-which
is determined by the accident of birth and which in no way has been
shown to be an accurate indicator of a natural difference of educa-
tional ability. 97
However, one might too quickly conclude, as did the trial court in
DeFunis, that after Brown the equal protection clause requires the
state to be neutral and color-blind in the field of education. The state
is dealing with persons of all "races" who are not significantly unequal
in educational ability, and thus race is an irrelevant characteristic. No
distribution based on race shall be authorized by state law-that is the
principle. This conclusion, as appropriate and desirable as it is in the
long run, would be premature. To embrace this principle now as con-
stitutional law simply would be unjust. It would ignore the entire his-
tory of race relations in America, which cannot be ignored, and the
continuing deleterious consequences of this history which must be cor-
rected, and it would also ignore the important corrective role yet to be
played by distributive and corrective justice at the social level. The
ultimate goal is a society where the color of a person's skin is as irrele-
vant as his eye color when the law distributes rights, offices, duties and
other benefits. To achieve this society we may have to have "some of
the hair of the dog that bit us."
The usual exercise of corrective justice assumes that the legislature
traditionally has followed the principles of distributive justice and that
it has properly allocated rights, duties, offices and goods in the first
instance. The job of corrective justice is to protect and maintain the
distributive equilibrium against illegal invasions. Corrective justice
usually, but not always, is administered by courts. Thus, if one
member of the community encroaches upon another's rights, privi-
leges or property, disturbing the proper distributive equilibrium and
unjustifiably enriching himself, it is the function of a court to
re-establish the distributive equilibrium by returning the items to the
97. See text accompanying note 166 infra. For discussion of race and I.Q. compare
THE FALLACY OF I.Q. (C. Senna ed. 1973) with A. R. JENSEN. GENETICS AND EDUCATION
(1972).
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victim, thereby "making him whole," or by requiring the malefactor
to compensate the victim for his losses.98
The principles of distributive and corrective justice are obviously
relevant to the decisions and remedies fashioned in Brown and other
school desegregation cases. The use of Plessy's doctrine by a state was
held in Brown I to violate the principle of distributive justice. Since
the state, in effect, improperly invaded the interests of some of its citi-
zens on behalf of others,99 a court can make the injured parties whole
through the use of corrective justice at the distributive level. By using
corrective justice in this way, a racial classification could appropri-
ately be required to identify the injured minority groups when admin-
istering the court's remedy. The Supreme Court has expressly held
that where a state has previously segregated its school children,
thereby breaching the principle of distributive justice that should have
prevailed, a court's remedial decree can correct this improper invasion
by establishing that balance of distributive justice which originally
should have been the distributive equilibrium. 100 The odd conse-
quence is that a court's remedial decree applying corrective justice can
properly require that school authorities use a racial classification when
assigning students to various schools as a means to insure that the
color-blind principle of distributive justice prevails and that a unitary
school system is realized. 10' Thus, the Constitution is "color con-
98. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, ch. 4 (Loeb ed. 1934).
99. See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
100. See authorities cited in notes 10 1-02 infra.
101. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court
held:
In this case it is urged that the District Court has imposed a racial balance require-
ment of 71%-29% on individual schools. The fact that no such objective was ac-
tually achieved and would appear to be impossible tends to blunt that claim, yet
in the opinion and order of the District Court of December 1, 1969, we find that
court directing 'that efforts should be made to reach a 71-29 ratio in the various
schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school is racially dif-
ferent from the others . . . , [t] hat no school [should] be operated with an all-
black or predominantly black student body, [and] [t] hat pupils of all grades
[should] be assigned in such a way that as nearly as practicable the various
schools at various grade levels have about the same proportion of black and
white students.'
Id. at 23.
We see therefore that the use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a
starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible require-
ment. From that starting point the District Court proceeded to frame a decree that
was within its discretionary powers, as an equitable remedy for the particular cir-
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scious" when attempts are made to eliminate racial discrimination.
The teaching of distributive and corrective justice and of the desegre-
gation cases is that a racial classification can and perhaps must be
used to correct past violations of the principle of distributive justice.
The racial classification is corrective. In the usual school desegrega-
tion context it has no detrimental effect on any person because of
race, and it results in affording educational opportunity equally to all
equals. In so doing, the proper distributive equilibrium is established,
and in many school situations it is established for the first time in this
nation's history.
As indicated above, the usual application of corrective justice prin-
ciples presupposes that the principles of distributive justice were ap-
plied initially by legislatures, and therefore that a just social and legal
structure exists in accordance with the principles of distributive justice
and that invasions of the distributive equilibrium will be sporadic-to
be corrected by courts. That is why courts must first find a violation of
law before they can fashion a "correcting" remedy. The assumption is
not that the social order itself is malstructured and that wholesale vio-
lations of distributive principles have occurred at the hands of the leg-
islatures. But slavery, Plessy, "separate but equal," "Jim Crowism,"
Brown v. Board of Education and the entire history of race relations
cumstances. As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan or a district
court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness. Awareness of the racial
composition of the whole school systen is likely to be a useful starting point in
shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations. In sum, the very limited
use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the
District Court.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
This holding of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case was anticipated in United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) in which the Supreme Court
affirmed a desegregation order requiring that teachers be assigned so that the proportion
of white and black teachers in the system as a whole would be fairly reflected in the pro-
portion of white and black teachers in each school within that system. In order to achieve
this goal, it became the duty and it was absolutely necessary for the state to take a teach-
er's race into consideration when deciding upon the school to which he should be as-
signed. This duty of racial classification was explicitly approved by the Supreme Court
of the United States. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), opened the door
to the use of race as a criterion in student admissions and assignment when it held a
freedom-of-choice plan to be an impermissible basis for admitting or assigning students
where that plan failed to produce the constitutionally required result of a unitary system
of public education. A freedom-of-choice plan is innocent on its face, not being condi-
tioned by a racial classification. By rejecting it, the Supreme Court rejected the notion
that only non-racial criteria may be used and opened the door for the use of a racial
classification.
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in this country from its origins 102 painfully demonstrate that distribu-
tive justice has never been fully achieved in race relations. White so-
ciety unjustly enriched itself and damaged Blacks and some American
Indians first, by enslaving them, and later by exploiting their cheap
labor. Persons who are equals in reason and nature have been treated
unequally on a massive scale. The "racial" defects in American society
have been implanted not only in the law, but also in our personal atti-
tudes and in the socio-economic structure. These defects are one
symptom of a social order that has failed to meet not only the justifi-
able needs of minority group members, but human needs generally.
Thus, this type of social situation is radically different from the one
usually assumed to exist when the principle of corrective justice is
applied. What is demanded is not a "case-by-case" adjudication, but
wholesale justice at the distributive level, establishing the principles of
distributive justice as they should have been established in the first in-
stance. It is this recognition that I believe led Professor Bittker to
write "that we can have a color-blind society in the long run only if
we refuse to be color-blind in the short run.' 103
Given America's history of race relations, there need not first be a
finding by a court that some aspect of race relations is contrary to the
requirements of distributive justice before a legislative body constitu-
tionally can use a racial classification in a remedial and corrective
way. Moreover, Aristotle's theory of justice avoids the issue of precise
correspondence between individual deprivation and need. One need
not determine that any specific person has been subjected to racial or
ethnic discrimination before the State can administer a corrective
102. Seg, e.g., W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION 'ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF
RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1967); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (1957); G. MRYDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
103. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with the
equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm or im-
poses a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color
blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being per-
petuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. The criterion is the rele-
vancy of color to a legitimate governmental purpose. . . . Here race is relevant,
because the governmental purpose is to offer Negroes equal educational opportuni-
ties.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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preference based on race or ethnicity; even those few minority group
members who have "made it" in American society would probably be
much further along the ladder of success if it were not for the racial
practices of the dominant white society. Three hundred years of im-
morality has taken its toll of our social institutions. What needs to be
corrected is the institutional structure of society itself; generally, that
is a task for legislation, and a legislature need not await an author-
izing declaration by a court in each instance. Under these circum-
stances it is constitutionally permissible for state officials voluntarily,
without judicial coercion, to undertake to correct the imbalances and
to afford effective equal educational opportunity by using a racial cri-
terion:104
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, how-
ever, that would not be within the authority of a federal court.
The above quotation states part of the rationale for the law school's
policy, and with one modification it summarizes that policy. Having
been limited by law to a first-year class of between 145 and 150 stu-
dents and confronted with 1,601 applicants, there simply was no way
104. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). That the
fourteenth amendment itself does not preclude state officials from using racial classifi-
cations when making educational opportunities equally available is additionally dem-
onstrated by those cases wherein a school board, which although under no duty to inte-
grate, voluntarily seeks to eliminate the effects of de facto, residential segregation by
assigning students to schools under a racial classification. These practices have been
upheld. See, e.g., Addabbo v. Donovan, 16 N.Y. 2d 619, 209 N.E.2d 112, 261 N.Y.S.2d
68 (1965) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); Offerman v. Nitkowski. 248 F. Supp. 129
(W.D. N.Y. 1965), aff d, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967) and Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y. 2d
193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
This thrust of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States was summa-
rized in 1968 in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency. 395 F.2d 920.
931-32 (2d Cir. 1968):
What we have said may require classification by race. That is something which the
Constitution usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an impermissible classifi-
cation, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn
for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality. Where it is drawn for the purpose
of achieving equality it will be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid
unequal treatment by race, it will be required.
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for the law school to afford equal educational opportunity to all appli-
cants qualified for law study. To ensure that minority group appli-
cants would effectively enjoy equal educational opportunity the law
school gave them a preference, but it gave that preference to "only
'qualified' minority applicants" and "'many minority applicants were
denied admission.' 0 5
VI. THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
A state cannot function without legislatively classifying persons
within its jurisdiction for various purposes and treating some differ-
ently from others. Any state classification is subject to challenge as
denying equal protection. The fundamental requirement for the va-
lidity of a classification is that it include "all [but no more than those]
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.' 1 0 6 This formulation can be difficult to apply because it requires
a determination of the purpose of the law with respect to each legisla-
tive classification, as well as a determination of the specific meaning of
"similarly situated" in varying contexts. Within this general frame-
work the Supreme Court of the United States has evolved two basic
approaches to judicial review under the equal protection clause. 07
One standard approach, involving a restrained judicial review, is
the "rational basis" test which allows great deference to the judgment
of state legislatures. Generally, the Supreme Court applies this test
when reviewing a state's classifications in economic, fiscal or regula-
tory matters. This test affords the presumption of constitutionality to a
state's classification, and it will be upheld if "any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify [the classification] .,"108
A second approach involves a more active judicial review applying
a stricter test that requires "the most rigid scrutiny" of state classifica-
tions that are based on race,10 9 alienage, 110 national origin"' and
105. 82 Wn. 2d at 39, 507 P.2d at 1185-86.
106. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rav. 341,
346 (1949). See also F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
107. For discussion, see Note, Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
108. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
109. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
110. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
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soon, perhaps, on sex. 112 These classifications appear to be inherently
"suspect" because they are predicated on an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth. To impose legal disabilities
on persons because they possess such characteristics would appear to
violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bearsome [reasonable] relationship to individual responsibility...
The Court has stated the "most rigid scrutiny" test as follows: 114
The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in
the States. [Citations omitted.]
• . . At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that
racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be
subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' [citation omitted] and, if they
are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate ....
This test does not disallow a state's use of a racial classification. In
this sense, it does not go as far as the color-blind theory. Instead, it
shifts the burden of persuasion to the state, eliminating the presump-
tion of constitutionality, and requires the state to show a compelling
and overriding interest justifying its use of the racial classification.
This test also applies to certain rights or interests that have been
ranked as "fundamental," such as the right to vote, 115 to criminal
I 11. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948): Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943).
112. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973), four justices (Brennan,
Douglas, Marshall and White) voted that "classifications based upon sex, like classifica-
tions based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subject ot strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 1768. Three justices (Powell,
Burger and Blackman) joined the above four justices on the disposition of the case on
the ground of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), but stated that they "cannot join the
opinion.., which would hold that all classifications based upon sex . . . 'are inherently
suspect and must therefore be subject to judicial scrutiny.' " Id. at 1773. They left open
the possibility that they might later join the above-named four justices but wanted to
await the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment. Justice Stewart separately joined in the
disposition on the basis of Reed v. Reed, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
113. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See also L.
KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW-THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
114. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967).
115. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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appeals n16 and to interstate travel.'17 Washington's Supreme Court
held that the "most rigid scrutiny" test is properly applicable to the
equal protection question presented by DeFunis."18
The above formulation of the "most rigid scrutiny" test comes from
Loving v. Virginia"19 where Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, like
those of 16 other states, employed a racial classification solely for the
purpose of prohibiting intermarriage between "any white person" and
"any colored person.' 20 Besides classifying by race, the statute
clearly impaired the freedoms of choice and association. It allowed
intermarriage between "colored persons," however they may be de-
fined, but, in effect, required that whites marry only whites, thereby
demonstrating that the statute had been "designed to maintain White
Supremacy.'' z2 Given this analysis, "the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification,' 22 because the state had failed to
show any "legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious ra-
cial discrimination which justifies this classification.' 23 Presumably, if
the state could have carried the burden and shown an overriding and
compelling interest, its racial classification would have been upheld.
But since Virginia did not carry its burden, a unanimous Supreme
Court held the anti-miscegenation statute to be an unconstitutional
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws. Mr. Justice Stewart
concurred specially on the ground that it is not constitutionally per-
missible for a state to make "the criminality of an act depend upon the
race of the actor."' 24
Loving's test appears to be the proper one to be applied to De-
Funis, but the decision in Loving does not dispose of DeFunis. Just as
DeFunis is different from the school desegregation cases, so is it dif-
ferent from Loving and its line of cases. First, the law school was not
imposing a criminal penalty on anyone by using a racial classification,
as was Virginia in Loving when it prohibited intermarriage between
116. SeeGriffin v.Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
117. See Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
118. 82 Wn. 2d at 31-32, 507 P.2d at 1181-82.
119. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 12. This was also the position of Mr. Justices Douglas and Stewart con-
curring in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).
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white and colored persons and thereby deprived them of freedom of
choice and association in selecting marriage partners. Second, the law
school was faced with 1,601 applicants and a student limitation im-
posed by law. Since it could not admit all the applicants, it was forced
to pick and choose among them. There was no comparable necessity
requiring segregation of the races in Loving. Third, the law school did
not solely impose detriments, as Virginia did in Loving, but it also
conferred the benefit of effective equal educational opportunity upon
certain minority group applicants. Without the detriment imposed on
DeFunis, the objective of making equal education opportunities effec-
tive clearly would be a legitimate state purpose, but maintaining
White Supremacy by using a racial classification to abridge freedoms
of choice and association would not be.
DeFunis is a case of first impression, and the "most rigid scrutiny"
test seems to govern it. Under this test at least three immediate ques-
tions arise: (1) Is the use of the racial classification "necessary" to the
accomplishment of the state's objective, or is there a more reasonable
alternative available for accomplishing the same purpose without
using the racial classification; (2) if the racial classification is neces-
sary, is the otherwise legitimate state purpose of affording equal edu-
cational opportunities compelling and overriding when it makes equal
legal educational opportunity effective by awarding an admission
preference to certain minority group members while also imposing the
burden of racial discrimination on nonminority group persons such as
DeFunis; and (3) if so, what is the class of "similarly situated" mi-
nority group persons with respect to the purpose of the law school's
racial classification?
VII. THE NECESSITY OF A RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
A racial classification must be "necessary" in order to achieve an
otherwise legitimate state purpose. The burden is on the state to show
such necessity. There can be no question that the general purpose of
making available equal educational opportunity is a legitimate state
purpose. The question is whether the state can achieve its purpose by
using a racial classification. The requirement of "necessity" means
that a court must identify whether any classification other than a ra-
cial classification will accomplish equally well the state's purpose of
making legal education equally available. If so, then the state cannot
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use the constitutionally suspect racial classification. For example, in
McLaughlin v. Florida125 the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that
Florida's anti-miscegenation statute involving a racial classification
was directed toward achievement of the legitimate state purpose of
preventing interracial cohabitation. Nevertheless, the Court held the
statute unconstitutional on the ground that the state's purpose of pre-
venting interracial cohabitation could be achieved without the use of a
racial classification simply by enforcing the "general, neutral, and ex-
isting ban on illicit behavior ..... 126
The state's purpose in DeFunis was to make the opportunity for a
legal education equally available to persons of all racial groups, in-
cluding those that previously had been deprived. Can this purpose be
accomplished without using a racial classification? I think the answer
is NO because to accomplish its purpose the state must use a racial
classification first to identify all the racial groups. If the state finds
that any racial group lacks equal educational opportunity it then may
move to correct this deficiency. I know of no reasonable alternative
classification that could equally well accomplish the state's purpose.
That which the state seeks to correct is a racial deprivation of equal
opportunity for a legal education. There is no way to redress the evil
of racial deprivation other than by using a racially conditioned admis-
sion preference and applying it to those groups which have been so
deprived because of their race. It would appear that a racial classifica-
tion is as much of a necessity in DeFunis as it was in the remedial and
corrective decrees fashioned by courts under the authority of Brown I
and Brown I.
VIII. THE OVERRIDING AND COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST
Once it is determined that a racial classification is necessary, a
court then must balance the underlying interest of society in not per-
mitting a state to use racial classifications against the interest a state
sets forth for using them in order to determine whether the state's in-
terest is compelling and overriding. However, two preliminary observ-
ations are required. First, there is a deep and bitter irony that today a
125. 379 U.S. 184(1964).
126. Id. at 196.
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state constitutionally is required to show an overriding and compelling
state interest before it can step in and help minority groups who are
struggling to free themselves from the deleterious consequences of ra-
cial discrimination, while previously states directly imposed those
burdens or racial discrimination upon minority groups and were re-
quired only to meet the permissive "reasonable basis" test. This type
of constitutional interpretation ironically imposes the worst of both
worlds upon minority group members with their bread buttered on
neither side.127 Second, the law school's preferential admission policy
obviously is not a covert attempt to stigmatize the majority white race
as inferior and thereby to subject its members to invidious racial dis-
crimination. Nor is it reasonable to believe that extending a few ad-
missions preferences to minority group members will have that effect.
Since the object is to correct the previously unbalanced scales with
respect to the opportunity for a legal education, allowing for distribu-
tive justice, the preferential admissions policy administered by the law
school can not be classified as "invidious" in the constitutional sense
as that word has previously been understood. "The goal of this policy
is not to separate the races [and to stigmatize one of them], but to
bring them together."' 28
Washington's Supreme Court held that:129
[T]he state has an overriding interest in promoting integration of
minority groups in the law schools, and considering that minority
groups participate on an equal basis in the tax support of the law
school, we find the state interest in eliminating racial imbalance within
public legal education to be compelling.
There can be no quarrel with this holding. Equality of access lies at
the core meaning of the equal protection clause. But minority groups
have not enjoyed equal access to legal education. The national data
showing the gross disparities in minority representation have been pre-
127. For exploration of the possibility of a permissive standard of review where the
racial classification is "benign," see Note, Developments in the Lawt-Equal Protection
82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1104-17 (1969).
128. DeFunis, 82 Wn.2d at 27, 507 P.2 at 1179. If the sole purpose of a racial
classification is to discriminate against persons on account of race, the classification will
be held unconstitutional because of the impermissible, discriminatory purpose. Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065. 1103-04 (1969).
129. DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 33, 507 P.2d at 1182.
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sented,130 and the law school considers itself a national law school.' 31
While relevant, these national data are not conclusive. The overriding
and compelling interest required by the equal protection clause is
bounded by the scope of application of that clause. The equal protec-
tion clause applies only within the borders of a state; it does not apply
across state borders. Thus, in DeFunis the overriding and compelling
state interest required by the equal protection clause is one that must
be located within the boundaries of the State of Washington. Under
this analysis whether a state has a compelling state interest and the
duration of such an interest will vary from state to state, depending
upon the conditions existing within that state. A state law school in
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana or Georgia, for example, may pre-
sent a much stronger compelling state interest, and it may be of longer
duration, than the compelling interest presented by the state school of
law in Washington.
The status of minority groups in the State of Washington is not any
better than that generally existing in the nation; in some ways it is
worse. In 1970, the State of Washington had a total population of
3,409,169 of whom 3,251,055 or 95.4 percent were classed as white
(since 1940, this category also has included Mexican Americans);
71,308 or 2.1 percent were Negro, and 33,386 or 1 percent were
American Indian.132 Because the U.S. Bureau of Census places all
Mexican Americans in the white category, no direct figures are avail-
able from that source. However, in a letter to the author, an official of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development indicated
that in 1970 there were 70,734 Spanish-speaking people in the State
of Washington or 2.1 percent of the population. It was estimated that
by April, 1972, the state's Spanish-speaking population had out-
stripped the Black population, having grown to more than 72,000
while the Black population was approximately 71,000.133 Thus, the
total number of persons in the State of Washington in 1970 who were
130. See discussion in notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
131. The University of Washington School of Law attracts students from throughout
the nation and seeks to graduate lawyers who "are prepared to practice anywhere in the
United States." U. OF WASHINGTON BULL. I I (Dec. 1970).
132. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Tables 17 and 18 (1973).
133. On file University of Washington Law School Library. The Appendix infra sets
forth the racial composition of the four northwest states as of 1970.
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Black, American Indian or Mexican American was about 175,428 or
about 5.2 percent of the total population.
In 1970, there were approximately 5,250 (4,550 active and 700
inactive) members of the Washington State Bar Association. Of the
4,550 active lawyers in the State of Washington, only twenty were
Blacks, three of whom were judges, and there were only five who were
part or full-blooded American Indian. 134 According to the Wash-
ington State Bar Association, there was not one member of the Wash-
ington bar known to be Spanish surnamed or Mexican American! 135
These Washington figures indicate that in 1970 there was one ac-
tive Anglo lawyer for approximately every 720 Whites in the state. But
there was only one black lawyer for approximately every 4,195
Blacks in the state, and there was only one American Indian lawyer
for approximately every 6,677 American Indians in the State. There
was not one Mexican American lawyer for 70,734 Mexican Ameri-
cans in the State!136 Clearly, this is shocking; Washington's Supreme
Court recognized as much when it observed that "minorities have
been, and are, grossly underrepresented in the law schools-and con-
sequently in the legal profession--of this state and this nation." 137
134. The number of practicing Indian lawyers in the U.S. is statistically appalling:
Although no segment of our society more needs representation within the legal
profession than does the American Indian, no group has fewer lawyers. There are
well over a half-million Indians. To achieve proportionate representation at the
bar, five hundred to a thousand Indians would have to be lawyers: yet there are
perhaps not more than two dozen practicing lawyers who identify as Indian in the
entire United States. The number who are actively engaged in work affecting In-
dians is even less.
Christopher & Hart, Indian Law Scholarship Program at the University of New Mexico,
1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 691, 692-93. On the other hand, "[no] American comes within
the sweep of as many laws as the Indian living on a reservation.~ Id. at 691.
Because the very existence of Indian organizations is now dependent on the plea-
sure of Congress, law has taken on a role in the life of Indians that it has thankfully
not assumed over the life of almost any other group except for those involved in
subversive activities. The government's power is of life and death dimensions.
Price, Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profession, 1969
LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 161. 163.
135. Telephone interview with unidentified party, Washington State Bar Associa-
tion. Confirmation in writing did not follow as requested. The author believes there are
two lawyers who are Mexican American who work for the government but does not
know whether they are members of the Washington State Bar Association.
136. Mexican Americans suffer other severe disadvantages. One economist has
stated "that Mexican-Americans have a more severe employment handicap than Ne-
groes." He cited language difficulties and occupations that are seasonal or short-term as
major factors. Kaplan, Equality in an Unequal World, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363. 375 n. 2 5
(1966).
137. DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 32-33, 507 P.2d at 1182.
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The State of Washington has a deep and abiding interest in correcting
these disparities and in making sure that legal education is in fact
made equally available. While the state voluntarily undertook to
provide a corrective program of law school admission it may actually
have been under a constitutional duty to have done So. 1 38
That access to legal education has effectively been denied to mi-
nority group members in the State of Washington is only too painfully
evident from these statistics. Yet, minority group members pay state
taxes, a part of which go to support the University of Washington and
its law school. In fact, since minority groups in the state are found
disproportionately in the lowest income classes, and since Washing-
ton's tax structure is highly regressive, minority groups tend to incur a
disproportionately heavy state tax burden.139
138. Supreme Court cases establish that absent overriding considerations all per-
sons within a state are entitled to equal access to benefits and opportunities distributed
by the state. Statistics can play the vital role of showing that all persons have not enjoyed
equal access. The use of statistical information to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination has long been recognized as constitutionally valid. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The validity of this approach was recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court. See United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484
(1972); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 541 (1972). For discussion
and application of this approach to race relations, -see Nisenbaum, Race Quotas, 8
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS--CIv. LIB. L. REV. 128, 131-41 (1973). The gross statistical dis-
parities described in the text show a massive differential distribution of a societal
benefit-access to public, legal education-according to race and a breach of the princi-
ple of distributive justice. Courts have held in such circumstances that the denial of equal
access warrants the inference of discrimination and that "when a primafacie case of dis-
crimination is presented, the burden falls, forthwith, upon the State to overcome it."
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953) (emphasis added). If the state fails to pro-
duce positive evidence directly contradicting the prima facie case, a court will hold that
no such evidence exists because "if [the theory of the State] can possibly be conceived ...
we do not doubt that the State could have proved it." Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463, 468 (1947); accord, Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1942). See also Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2698 (1973). Thus, unless the state produces the nec-
essary evidence, the gross statistical disparity of access to legal education would be seen
by a court as a mandatory presumption requiring a holding of a violation of equal pro-
tection of the laws and a court could prescribe a racial quota-like remedy. Thus, the law
school could be under a constitutional duty to use a racially conditioned preferential
admission policy. See also Note, The Affirmative Duty to Integrate in Higher Educa-
tion, 79 YALE LJ. 666 (1970).
139. Washington's sales tax burden is one of the heaviest of any state and imposes a
relatively heavier burden on low income families. See TAX ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN WASHINGTON'S TAX STRUCTURE,
SECOND REPORT 4 (1968); Pechman, The Rich, the Poor and the Taxes They Pay, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 27 (Nov. 1969).
Furthermore, while the majority of America's and Washington's poor are not mi-
nority group members the great majority of America's and Washington's minority
groups are poor. For example, on a percentage basis four times as many Blacks are
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Given that Washington's minority groups have not enjoyed an
equal share of public legal education and that they pay state taxes,
part of which support the law school, it is obvious that the state has a
compelling and overriding interest in effectively making public legal
education equally available to minority groups for the simple reason
that under the equal protection clause a state is obligated to provide
equal opportunity to all its citizens. The state's law school may fulfill
that obligation voluntarily by using a racially conditioned preferential
admissions policy.
Washington's Supreme Court held that a second overriding and
compelling state interest is that the law school provide "all law stu-
dents with a legal education that will adequately prepare them to deal
with the societal problems which will confront them upon gradua-
tion," and that to do this adequately one cannot rely on books alone;
thus, "[t] he educational interest of the state in producing a racially
poor in this country as whites. Blacks, Mexican Americans and particularly American
Indians are economically right at the bottom.
The frequency of limited educational attainment markedly distinguishes America's
poor from its non-poor. Two-thirds of the heads of poor families have no more than an
eighth-grade education, but in the general population only one-third have such limited
education. Moreover, state supported higher education, although legally available to all,
is in fact available only to the more affluent. Two University of Wisconsin economists.
W. Lee Hansen and Burton Weisbrod, have studied California's system of colleges and
universities, supposedly the most egalitarian in our country. They found that students
from poor families were the least likely to be eligible to attend, and even if eligible. the
least likely to attend the colleges or university of the State of California. Proportion-
ately six times as many high school graduates whose families earned over $25,000
planned to attend California's system of higher education as did those whose parents
earned less than $4,000. Given the paucity of Washington lawyers who are minority
group members, there is reason to believe that their findings regarding California are
generally applicable also to Washington. See Hansen & Weisbrod, The Distribution of
Costs and Direct Benefits of Public Higher Education-The Case of California, 4 J. OF
HUMAN RESOURCES. 176 (1969).
The children of the poor-they numbered 12.5 million in 1966 and made up one sixth of
the Nation's children-must have a higher educational attainment if they are to be pro-
ductive members of our society, but over half the poor children are in families having
four or more children, many of them Black, Mexican American or Indian. J. Gwartney
has shown that changes in relative education have actually worked against non-whites
since World War II. The jobs requiring the most education show the greatest racial dis-
parities in income; thus, as all races become better educated, the comparative situation
of non-whites tends to deteriorate. J. Gwartney, Changes in the Non-WhitelWhite In-
come Ratio, 1939-67, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 872 (1970). The truth is that the bulk of our
racial minority groups are poor and greatly in need of effective equal educational op-
portunity. See Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile,
POVERTY IN AMERICA 42-82 (L. Ferman ed. 1965); S. MILLER & P. ROBY, THE FUTURE OF
INEQUALITY (1970); N. YETMAN & C. STEELE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY: THE Dy-
NAMICS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS (1971).
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balanced student body at the law school is compelling. ' 140 There can
be no quarrel with this holding.
Legal education is a unique and practical education. It prepares
men and women to play special roles in our society: we are "a nation
that professes deep regard for the dignity of man and that in practice
relies to an extraordinary degree upon the advice of professional law-
yers in the formation and execution of policy. ' 141 Mr. Chief Justice
Stone put it succinctly: 142
Law performs its function adequately only when it is suited to the
way of life of a people. With social change comes the imperative de-
mand that law shall satisfy the needs which change has created, and so
the problem, above all others, of jurisprudence in a modem world is
the reconciliation of the demands, paradoxical and to some extent
conflicting, that law shall at once have continuity with the past and
adaptability to the present and future . . . .We are coming to re-
alize more completely that law is not an end, but a means to an end-
the adequate control and protection of those interests, social and eco-
nomic, which are the special concern of government and hence of
law ....
The fourfold objectives of the law school at the University of
Washington are like those of other law schools: (1) to prepare for
public service; (2) to prepare for practice; (3) to prepare for law
teaching; and (4) to prepare for legal research. It is the special duty of
state supported legal education to supply the state and the nation with
many of our social inventors, as well as our social mechanics. From
the law student population comes Washington's main body of civic
leaders, judges, legislators and other public servants. It is the law
school which should train lawyers to be policy-makers for the even
more complete achievement of the democratic values which are the
professed ends of American policy. It is evident that if we are to pre-
serve and extend our traditions of equality and freedom, and if we are
to compete successfully at home and abroad with other ideologies and
philosophies, then all of our people must be educated, and all our
140. DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1184.
141. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203, 291 (1943).
142 See Smith, Harlan Fiske Stone: Teacher, Scholar and Dean, 46 COLUM. L. REv.
700, 708 (1946).
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lawyers must know the problems and ways of thought of the various
racial groups within our society. In short, if they are to do their jobs,
lawyers must be enlightened. Mr. Justice Holmes said that the aim of
the law school is "not to make men smart, but to make them wise in
their calling-to start them on a road which will lead them to the
master." 143
If an enlightened group of lawyers is a necessary factor in the equa-
tion of democracy, then it follows that they must be exposed first-hand
to America's most serious social problems. Since the problem of race
relations is America's number one domestic problem, 144 and since its
real dimensions cannot be appreciated fully from books alone, it fol-
lows that to be properly educated in law, students should associate
and be educated with students who come from all racial groups.145 In
that way class discussion, out-of-class discussion and legal education
generally are facilitated because diverse insights are brought to bear
on a common subject matter. This is what legal education is all about.
Thus, the state has a compelling educational interest in producing a
racially mixed group of law students because, as tomorrow's leaders of
our society, they will be required to know the problems well in order
to create peaceful and lawful solutions if our society is to endure.
The state has a third compelling interest: that of preserving the
public peace. Our nation recently has been beseiged by breaches of
public peace caused by racial violence and riots which periodically
threaten to renew. America's racial wounds are still deep and fes-
tering. Only a strong commitment of state and national action on an
unprecedented scale can shape a future that is compatible with the
proclaimed ideals of American society. Change must come; hopefully,
it will be peaceful and lawful change brought about by our courts and
143. 0. W. HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 39-40
(1920).
144. See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL Dis-
ORDERS (1968).
145. [A] Ithough the law is a highly learned profession. we are well aware that it is
an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for legal learning
and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions
with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would
choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and
the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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by our legislatures, rather than forced upon us by bloody violence in
our streets. 14
6
If we are to respond peacefully to the dimensions of this racial
problem, our institutions of legal education must produce lawyers,
legislators, judges and civil servants who are also minority group
members, because they are the persons most likely to be sensitive to
certain critical aspects of racial problems and to be the best represent-
146. This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward two societies, one
black, one white-separate and unequal.
Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and deepened
the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of Amer-
ican life; they now threaten the future of every American.
This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be re-
versed. Choice is still possible. Our principal task is to define that choice and to
press for a national resolution.
To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the
American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic values.
The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness. It is the
realization of common opportunities for all within a single society.
This alternative will require a commitment to national action-compassionate,
massive, and sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the
richest nation on this earth. From every American it will require new attitudes,
new understanding, and, above all, new will.
The vital needs of the nation must be met; hard choices must be made, and, if
necessary, new taxes enacted.
Violence cannot build a better society. Disruption and disorder nourish repres-
sion, not justice. They strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community
cannot-it will not-tolerate coercion and mob rule.
Violence and destruction must be ended-in the streets of the ghetto and in the
lives of people.
Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environ-
ment totally unknown to most white Americans.
What white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro can
never foiget-is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institu-
tions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major unfin-
ished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action that will pro-
duce quick and visible progress. It is time to make good the promises of American
democracy to all citizens-urban and rural. white and black, Spanish-surname,
American Indian, and every minority group.
Our recommendations embrace three basic principles:
" To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of the problems;
* To aim these programs for high impact in the immediate future in order to close
the gap between promise and performance;
* To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can change the system of
failure and frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.
These programs will require unprecedented levels of funding and performance,
but they neither probe deeper nor demand more than the problems which called
them forth. There can be no higher priority for national action and no higher claim
on the nation's conscience.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1-2 (1968) (em-
phasis added).
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atives of minority groups. Hopefully, if our nation has enough mi-
nority group members educated in the law, peaceful ways of change
will be developed in our courts and legislatures, sparing us from a
recurrence of the racial calamities of recent years. Increased minority
representation at the Bar tends to develop articulate and responsible
community leadership which opens the door of participation in the
processes and institutions of democratic government to minority
groups. The resolution of racial grievances can be accomplished
through the peaceful processes of law. These considerations afford a
state a third compelling interest recognized by Washington's Supreme
Court: "If minorities are to live within the rule of law, they must enjoy
equal representation within our legal system."1 47
In addition, minority group members who become lawyers are
symbols to minority youth that they too can "make it" within the
system. Every minority group member who becomes a doctor or
lawyer or other highly respected professional symbolizes the possi-
bility of socio-economic achievement to minority youth, and his im-
pact may well have a multiplier effect on the next generation. 148
Each of the three interests discussed individually above would
supply the overriding and compelling state interest,1 49 but surely, in
the aggregate, they fully meet the constitutional requirement.
The requirement that a state show a compelling interest in order to
justify its racial classification goes to its policy generally, and the
state's compelling and overriding interest in DeFunis is clear. Yet, a
related consideration must be explored even though it does not negate
the state's compelling interest. Persons such as Marco DeFunis, Jr.,
147. DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1184.
148. Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrinination Provi-
sions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 So. CAL. L. REv. 615 (1967).
149. Another, less compelling state interest is the adequate representation of mi-
nority groups. Non-minority group lawyers do represent minority group members, but
there is an intangible, but nontheless real, difference when a lawyer is also a member of
that minority group. For example:
Many Anglo and Spanish-speaking lawyers now attempt in good faith to represent
American Indians in tribal and personal matters. The vast differences between cul-
tures, however, make meaningful representation often difficult and in many cases
impossible. It is hardly surprising, then, that there is a desperate need for Indian
lawyers, for those individuals who have not only a critical skill but also have a spe-
cial understanding needed to deal effectively with the affairs of the people who have
too long been described as 'forgotten Americans.'
J. Fleishman, School of Law, University of New Mexico, Special Program in Law for
American Indians 2, 1969.
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are completely innocent; they are not responsible for the vast amounts
of racial discrimination that have occurred in America, and indeed,
they may themselves have suffered from racial or religious prejudice.
Yet, these innocent persons who are displaced by a racially condi-
tioned preferential law admission policy are the ones who must bear
the burden of correcting the evils of society's racial practices. These
are the persons required to forego their opportunity to be judged
strictly on their academic merit in order to afford an opportunity for
legal education to an academically less well qualified minority group
member solely on the basis of race. From the vantage point of persons
like DeFunis, the law school's admission policy can be viewed as ra-
cial discrimination with a deleterious impact enforced by law. This
consideration, as important as it is, does not eliminate the state's over-
riding and compelling interest. The interests presented by DeFunis
and others similarly situated are overridden by the state when it shows
a compelling interest justifying its use of a racial classification.
The interest exemplified by Marco DeFunis, Jr., impales the law
school on the horns of an unpleasant dilemma "of the very first impor-
tance." 50 One horn of the dilemma is that if the law school does not
use a preferential admissions policy to make legal education equally
available for minority group members, it then might be in breach of
its constitutional duty. 15' To do nothing would be to ignore the unjus-
tified present circumstances of minority groups-the consequences of
the long history of racial discrimination, the effective denial of equal
opportunity to study law and the glacial rate of social change in race
relations in this country such that many minority members have cause
to believe that America's institutions have consigned them to a fate of
permanent inferiority on racial grounds. Certainly Blacks, and to a
lesser extent Mexican Americans and American Indians, have made
some real gains during the past few decades. There has been some
progress. But a walk through the nearest ghetto with its rat-infested
housing and unemployed people will demonstrate how far minority
groups have to go. Thus, to do nothing means that the law school (and
by example the law?) should do nothing to help solve America's most
severe domestic problem; yet, helping to solve this problem is precisely
150. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 58 (1962).
151. See discussion at note 138 supra.
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what the law school ought to do and may well have a legal obligation
to do.' 52
The other horn of the dilemma is that if the Law School uses a ra-
cially conditioned preferential admissions policy, it is then involved in
the dirty business of racial discrimination by not judging applicants
strictly on their academic merits as they have been traditionally but
imprecisely measured by undergraduate grade point and Law School
Admission Tests. 15 3 Thus, the dilemma is clear: either the law school
fails to meet its obligation to make legal educational opportunity
equally available to members of all racial groups or the law school
engages in the nasty business of racial discrimination, and against
innocent parties.
This is a cruel dilemma, and it poses a hard choice. Without the
creation of new criteria that more accurately measure the "merit"' 54
of all law applicants, I do not see how this dilemma can be avoided. I
think a choice can be made first by recognizing that one of this na-
tion's highest priorities is the elimination of the adverse effects of ra-
cial discrimination, 155 and second by invoking the principle of the
lesser evil. Surely it is a lesser evil to deny law admission on racial
grounds to some whites for a few years 156 than to continue the current
denial of opportunity for legal education and to continue the paucity
152. Id.
153. That these traditional measures are not always accurate should be obvious.
Consider the problems encountered by American Indians: "[F] ew persons have any
confidence in the validity of a culture-bound test for measuring innate intelligence and
most tests of mental ability are agreed to be culture-bound (especially those of the
group variety)." L. COOMBS, THE EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN
STUDENT 83 (1970). "10] nly a test which has been validated for minorities can be
assumed to be free of inadvertent bias." EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures 5 (August 21, 1968). For the past 15 years, Yale's Law School has dis-
counted traditional academic measures when dealing with applicants whose histories
are culturally atypical but reflect a high probability of success. See Fleming & Pollak.
The Black Quota at Yale Law School-An Exchange of Letters, 19 THE PUB. INTEREST
44 (1970). And Yale is not alone: "[S]ome schools reported minority students who
scored low on the LSAT performing in the upper 25% of their classes." 1970 AALS
REPORT 32. Because of cultural differences not being taken into account in test situ-
ations, these traditional measures of academic ability may not meet the requirement of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) that "[b]asic intelligence must
have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process."
154. See discussion at note 153 supra.
155. That the elimination of the adverse effects of racial discrimination is one of
our highest national priorities has been stated and restated by governmental agencies.
legislatures. courts and politicians. The statements are collected in Revolution in Civil
Rights, CONG. Q. 21-31, 60-61, 100, 102 (June, 1968).
156. See discussion at note 20supra.
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of lawyers who are minority group members. 157  Large-scale
hire-the-handicapped programs exist without objection, and yet the
loss of an arm is often less of a handicap in American society than
being born with a dark skin. Moreover, physical handicaps have not
been deliberately inflicted by society as have racial handicaps.
IX. THE CLASS OF "SIMILARLY SITUATED" MINORITY
GROUP PERSONS
To recapitulate, it is clear that "courts must reach and determine
the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reason-
able in light of its purpose ... ,"158 To be constitutionally valid a clas-
sification that is suspect, such as race, must demonstrate a much
greater degree of relevance in relation to the purpose of the classifica-
tion than must non-suspect classifications used in economic, fiscal or
regulatory matters. As indicated above, not all suspect classifications
such as race are unconstitutional per se. The burden of justifying their
use is on the state, and they come to a court without a presumption of
constitutionality-indeed, with a presumption of unconstitutional-
ity.15 9 Moreover, under the "most rigid scrutiny" test a suspect classifica-
tion must be "necessary" in order to achieve a legitimate purpose of
the state.160 This requirement of "necessity" implies two further con-
siderations: (1) that a suspect classification will not be upheld if there
is a reasonable alternative available (considered supra), and (2) that
courts will be unlikely to tolerate, if at all, under- or over-
157. It is unlikely that a passive policy of nondiscrimination will achieve equality
for minority groups, and, indeed, affirmative action programs may not fully do the job:
The fact that alienation is such a circular process does not mean that nothing can be
done to deal with the problems of segregation. It does mean that antidiscriminatory
legislation alone cannot bring about instant integration. Instead, such legislation
would be more effective if accompanied by other efforts to overcome the psychol-
ogical barriers to integration.
Balough, Alienation in the Ghetto, 72 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 469, 477-78 (1967).
158. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
159. The ordinary presumption favoring a state's non-suspect classification, see,
e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), is reversed in the case of sus-
pect classifications and a showing by the state of the possibility of a rational basis for its
classification is insufficient, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). Thus, a
state must show a compelling and overriding interest in using a suspect classification.
160. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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inclusiveness of persons in the class of those who are "similarly
situated." 6 1
The definition of the class of those persons who are similarly situ-
ated is equally subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" test. One conse-
quence of such rigid scrutiny is that a court will not defer to legislative
judgment to the extent it does in cases of non-suspect classifications,
nor will a court assume that a set of facts exists which would uphold
the reasonableness of a state's suspect classification and its definition
of the class of similarly situated persons.' 62 The definition of the class
of persons similarly situated must be set forth clearly; the state must
introduce evidence showing that its supporting facts exist; and a defi-
nition that is under- or over-inclusive will not readily be upheld. 6 3
This constitutional requirement is the Achilles heel of the specific pref-
erential admissions program used by the law school, 164 although it
would not invalidate a carefully constructed affirmative action pro-
gram.
The law school failed to provide any definition whatsoever of the
"minority group members" who qualified for its admissions prefer-
ences. Furthermore, "[t] he admissions process does not include per-
sonal interviews and does not reveal whether applicants are poor or
affluent." 165 The law school allowed applicants to characterize them-
selves. No one knows what criteria the applicants actually used in
making their self-characterizations or whether any consistent set of
criteria was used. Without a definition first supplied by the law school,
there can be no accurate judgment by any court on whether the class of
persons granted the preference is coextensive with the class of persons
who ought to receive it; nor can there be accurate judgments on
whether the law school's classification is under- or over-inclusive, nor
whether the criteria defining a minority group person were properly
administered. Because of this lack of criteria it becomes impossible to
determine whether the class of persons similarly sistuated is properly
defined.
161. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483. 488-89 (1955). with
Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617, 627 (1952).
162. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9(1967).
163. See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARv. L. REV. 564, 582-83 (1965); Note, Developments in the La--Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065. 1117-20 (1967).
164. Although the question was passed on, Washington's Supreme Court failed to
explore thoroughly whether the class was precisely defined or whether it was over- or
under-inclusive. 82 Wn. 2d at 36-37, 507 P.2d at 1184-85.
165. 82 Wn. 2d at 16. 507 P.2d at 1173.
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One reason why it is so difficult to identify who is a bona fide
member of a racial minority group is that the concept of "race"
has no independent or scientific validity. Scientists such as geneti-
cists, biologists or physical anthropologists generally agree that MAN,
the genus Homo, constitutes a single species to which all living "races"
belong. A species is a natural inbreeding population that is reproduc-
tively isolated from all other populations in the sense that its members
are not capable of mating with members of other species and pro-
ducing fertile offspring. Thus, a species is a genetically closed system
and is the basic group for biological and anthropological classifica-
tion. The basic unit of the species is the individual gene carrying or-
ganism which in the human species is the individual. Between the in-
dividual and the species is another layer of classification of human
beings known as "race." A racial classification is a classification of a
population group that exists within a species and which, historically,
has tended to inbreed among itself for long periods of time due to the
firmness of either its social or geographical boundaries. This endog-
amy results in certain similar physical characteristics which are
sometimes classified as "racial." The number of "races" of mankind is
infinite, and different classificatory systems have listed as few as two
and as many as two hundred "races." It all depends on whether the
classifier is a "lumper," who groups many varieties of characteristics
into one "racial" group because he believes their differences are too
unimportant to warrant separate classification, or a "splitter" who be-
lieves that any major distinction of characteristic merits a separate
"racial" classification. The point is that there is no scientifically valid
classification known as "race." It is merely a collection of a group of
persons that is made as a matter of convenience. The classificatory
criterion ultimately rests on a value judgment. Moreover, whenever an
individual mates outside his "racial" group, the proper "racial" classi-
fication of the offspring is immediately put in question. This last con-
sideration assumes great importance when miscegenation-which for
the past five centuries has achieved unprecedented rates in human his-
tory-becomes widespread because "racial" classifications of conveni-
ence then become even more blurred.' 66 Accurately speaking, for
MAN there is but one "race"-the human race.
166. For full discussion, see L. MORRIS, HUMAN POPULATIONS, GENETIC VARIATION
AND EVOLUTION (1971); S. GARN, HUMAN RACES (3d ed. 1971); R. GOLDSBY, RACE AND
RACES (1971); J. BARZUN, RACE: A STUDY IN SUPERSTITION (1965); A. MONTAGU, MAN'S
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While accurate physiological criteria defining race are not availa-
ble, the law school could have used certain social and racial classifica-
tions upheld by the Supreme Court in the past. For example, in the
infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson,1 67 the Supreme Court did not
disallow Louisiana's definition of the "colored races" as applied to
Plessy, who "averred that [he] was seven-eights Caucasian and
one-eighth African blood" and "that the mixture of colored blood was
not discernible in him."1 68 Or the law school could have adopted
Congress' classification of "quarter-bloods" that is applied to Amer-
ican Indians. 169 Finally, to insure completeness of the class the law
school should have considered whether Oriental Americans should
have been afforded a preference for they, too, have suffered mightily
from overt and institutional racial prejudices, especially on this na-
tion's West Coast.1 7 0
The law school relied upon self-characterizations made by appli-
cants on their applications, but there is a fatal lack of identity or con-
gruity in the racial categories. The law school allowed an applicant to
circle one of the following on his application: "Afro-American, Amer-
ican Indian, Caucasian, Mexican American, Oriental, Other (specify)
.... 171 But it awarded its law admission preferences to "Black
Americans, Chicano Americans, American Indians and Philippine
Americans.11 7 2 With the exception of "American Indian," the catego-
ries for self-characterization provided on the law school application
form are not identical with the categories of persons qualifying for an
admission preference. For example, a law school applicant cannot
self-characterize himself as a "Philippine American," although Philip-
pine Americans qualify for an admission preference, but an applicant
can characterize himself as "Oriental." Unless a Philippine American
applicant considered himself as "Other" and so specified on his appli-
cation, he would never surface as a candidate for one of the law
school's admission preferences. Thus, there could be under-inclusion
MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (1964) and Garn & Coon, On the
Number of Races of Mankind, 57 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 996 (1955).
167. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
168. Id. at 538.
169. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 607 (1946).
170. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
171. University of Washington School of Law Application for Admission. Form A
(on file in the law school library).
172. 82 Wn. 2d at 18 n.3, 507 P.2d at 1174.
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within the class. On the other hand, each applicant otherwise qualified
for law study who characterized himself as "Afro-American," "Mex-
ican American" or "American Indian" automatically would receive
preferential treatment even though the applicant could have been
"caucasian" and honestly, but erroneously circled the wrong category
or the applicant intentionally circled the wrong category in order to
receive a preference. Thus, the class would be over-inclusive.
Furthermore, the actions of the law deans, and perhaps the com-
mittee, raise a question of whether the racial preference and
non-racial criteria were properly administered. 173 Finally, the law
school's use of its racial classifications is not strictly related to its pur-
pose of effectively making legal education available to all members of
various racial groups for the reason that some racial groups justifying
a preference may not qualify for one. For example, there is no specific
indication that Oriental Americans are effectively receiving equal
opportunity for legal education. Thus, to the extent evidence exists on
the question of the similarly situated class in relation to purpose it is
against the law school. For these reasons, I conclude that the law
school's affirmative action program of giving racial preferences in
Admissions is defective and unconstitutional. On the other hand, a
carefully constructed and administered affirmative action program
which properly defined the racially preferred groups could validly
pass this test of constitutionality.
X. CONCLUSION
Under current equal protection precedents a state law school con-
stitutionally can award a racially conditioned preference in law admis-
sions so long as it does so within a carefully constructed and openly
administered affirmative action program. The compelling and over-
riding justification for using a specific racial classification would exist
as long as that state's institutions function to deny a racial group equal
opportunity for a legal education. Hopefully, the use of a racial classi-
fication will be a short-term, temporary expedient: 17 4
The ideal to which we must work is of course the provision of a basic
173. See notes 41, 42 and 45 and accompanying text supra.
174. Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1063, 1073 (1968).
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primary educational system which will be of such uniformly good
quality on a national level that, combined with the elimination of gross
economic inequality, it will remove the necessity for compensatory
expedients.
This goal will not be achieved in a day, but justice demands that we
not ignore the hopelessly unfair and uncompetitive position into which
minority groups have been thrust by the inequitable operation of
America's social system. Affirmative action programs in law education
are one salutary response to this situation.
However, the elements of the program must be set forth in writing
in clear language that a person of ordinary intelligence can read and
understand. Moreover, given the fact that a constitutionally suspect
class-race-is used, the program and all its component parts should
be published well in advance of its use so that a clear description of
the program will be fully and equally available to all. The constitu-
tional use of a constitutionally suspect classification demands that its
administration be open and well above reproach, and that the details
of its administration be honestly recorded and made publicly available
to all. Nothing less than these requirements can be tolerated when a
state is constitutionally permitted to use a racial classification in order
to confer rights, duties, offices, benefits or detriments.
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